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SUMMARY TABLE 
2006 2007 2008 2009
 
OUTPUT 
 
(Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure  5.7 6.5 3.0 3.3
Public Net Current Expenditure  5.3 5.0 4.0 3.5
Investment  3.1 1.5 -7.4 0.0
Exports  4.4 6.6 5.4 5.7
Imports  4.4 6.0 4.0 5.3
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  5.7 4.9 1.8 3.1
Gross National Product (GNP)  6.5 4.6 1.6 3.0
GNP per capita (constant prices)  3.8 2.0 0.3 1.9
 
PRICES 
 
 (Annual Growth %)        
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)  2.7 2.9 2.9 2.5
Consumer Price Index (CPI)  4.0 4.9 3.4 2.2
Wage Growth  4.9 5.5 4.0 3.5
 
LABOUR MARKET        
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s))  2,039 2,100 2,099 2,123
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s))  93 102 135 141
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force)  4.4 4.6 6.0 6.2
 
PUBLIC FINANCE        
Exchequer Balance (€m)  2,264 -1,619 -5,339 -7,524
General Government Balance (€m)  5,107 904 -2,319 -4,110
General Government Balance (% of GDP)  2.9 0.5 -1.2 -2.0
General Government Debt (% of GDP)  25.1 25.3 27.2 29.6
 
EXTERNAL TRADE        
Balance of Payments Current Account (€m)  -7,271 -8,834 -8,337 -8,669
Current Account (% of GNP)  -4.9 -5.6 -5.1 -5.0
 
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (end of year)       
US$/€ Exchange Rate  1.32 1.43 1.51 1.50
STG£/€ Exchange Rate   0.67 0.70 0.76 0.76
Main ECB Interest Rate   3.50 4.00 3.75 3.75
      
 
SUMMARY 
It has been evident for some time that 2008 was likely to be a year of slow 
economic growth. The leading indicators for house building that emerged last year 
suggested that this sector would contract in 2008. The absence of an SSIA effect 
also pointed to lower consumption growth in 2008. In the more recent weeks and 
months, most of the international developments are such that they will have the 
effect of compounding the difficulties that the economy is facing this year. Among 
these developments are the appreciation of the euro, the slowing in economic 
growth in the United States and the on-going difficulties in international financial 
markets.  
 
For 2008, we now expect GNP to grow by 1.6 per cent in volume terms and for 
GDP to grow by 1.8 per cent. Much of the slowdown in growth is related to an 
anticipated contraction in investment of 7.4 per cent in 2008. This is due, in turn, 
to a contraction in housing investment of about 30 per cent. Consumption is 
expected to grow by 3 per cent in 2008, well down on the figure estimated for 2007 
of 6.5 per cent. 
 
As a result of the slower pace of economic growth, there is expected to be no 
net employment growth in 2008. The rate of unemployment is forecast to increase 
to 6 per cent. The public finances are expected to move further into deficit. We 
now anticipate a General Government deficit of 1.2 per cent of GDP, above the 
Government’s Budget Day forecast of 0.9 per cent of GDP. 
 
For 2009, we expect a modest recovery. Against a background of an improving 
international climate and with the easing in the contraction in house building, we 
expect GNP to grow by 3 per cent and for GDP to grow by 3.1 per cent. The 
contraction in investment in 2008 will no longer be present. Consumption is 
forecast to grow by 3.3 per cent and export growth is anticipated to increase to 5.7 
per cent. 
 
This recovery will lead to a resumption of employment growth. We expect to 
see an extra net 24,000 jobs created in 2009. However, the rate of unemployment 
will continue to increase in 2009 and will reach 6.2 per cent. For both 2008 and 
2009, our forecasts are based on a rapid slowdown in inward migration. The 
deterioration in the public finances is expected to continue in 2009, in spite of the 
recovery, with the General Government deficit forecast to reach 2 per cent of 
GDP. 
 
On inflation, we expect to see an easing in the rate of CPI inflation in 2008 and 
2009 due largely to a more benign interest rate environment. CPI inflation is 
forecast to average 3.4 per cent in 2008 and 2.2 per cent in 2009 while HICP 
inflation is forecast to average 2.9 per cent in 2008 and 2.5 per cent in 2009. The 
easing in HICP inflation between 2008 and 2009 is partly related to an anticipated 
easing in wage pressures as a result of a weakening in the labour market. 
 
In the General Assessment, we draw attention to two issues. First, we note again 
the deterioration in the public finances and suggest that the Government will find it 
difficult to contain this deterioration. Second, we highlight the importance of 
growth in services exports for recent economic growth and for our forecasts. 
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 NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2007 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
  Estimate €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 82,483 90,919 8,436 5,361 10.2 3.5 6.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 24,939 27,808 2,868 1,247 11.5 6.2 5.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 46,027 47,012 985 709  2.1 0.6 1.5 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 139,766 148,633 8,867 9,218 6.3 -0.2 6.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1,476   664  -812  -812    
      
Final Demand 294,691 315,035 20,344 15,854 6.9 1.4 5.4 
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120,997 129,793 8,796 7,298 7.3 1.2 6.0 
less:      
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -44    
      
GDP at Market Prices 174,705 186,253 11,548 8,599 6.6 1.6 4.9 
less:      
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,575 -27,075 -1,500 -1,773  5.9 -1.0  6.9 
      
GNP at Market Prices 149,130 159,179 10,049  6,796  6.7 2.1 4.6 
    
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
  Estimate   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,195 3,259 64 2.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72,426 78,923 6,497 9.0 
  Other: 59,649 62,530 2,881 4.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -329 -200   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011   
     
Net Domestic Product 133,931 143,502 9,571 7.1 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25,575 -27,075 -1,500 5.9 
     
National Income 108,356 116,427 8,072 7.4 
Depreciation 18,436 19,903 1,467 8.0 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 126,792 136,331 9,539 7.5 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,338 22,848 510 2.3 
     
GNP at Market Prices 149,130 159,179 10,049  6.7 
    
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
    
 2006 2007 Change in 
2007 
  Estimate  
      €m €m          €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 18,769 18,840 71 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,575 -27,075 -1,500 
Net Transfers -465 -600  -135 
    
Balance on Current Account -7,271 -8,835 -1,564 
as % of GNP -4.9 -5.6  -0.7 
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 FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2008 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Estimate Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume
       
Private Consumer Expenditure 90,919 95,754 4,835 2,728 5.3 2.3 3.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27,808 30,449 2,642 1,112 9.5 5.3 4.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47,012 44,728 -2,284 -3,491 -4.9 2.8 -7.4 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 148,633 157,876  9,244 8,033 6.2 0.8 5.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 664 531  -133 0    
       
Final Demand 315,035 329,338 14,303 8,470 4.5 1.8 2.7 
less:       
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 129,793 137,273 7,480 5,156 5.8 1.7 4.0 
less:       
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -26    
       
GDP at Market Prices 186,253 193,076  6,823  3,340 3.7 1.8 1.8 
less:       
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,075 -28,341 -1,266 -710 4.7 2.0 2.6 
       
GNP at Market Prices 159,179 164,735  5,557  2,609 3.5 1.8 1.6 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
Change in 2008 
 
 Estimate Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,259 3,324  65 2.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 78,923 82,073 3,149 4.0 
  Other: 62,530 64,296 1,765 2.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200   
 Statistical          
  Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011   
     
Net Domestic Product 143,502 148,482  4,980 3.5 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -27,075 -28,341 -1,266 4.7 
     
National Income 116,427 120,141 3,714 3.2 
Depreciation 19,903 20,832   929 4.7 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 136,331 140,973 4,642 3.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,848 23,762 914  4.0 
     
GNP at Market Prices 159,179 164,735 5,557 3.5 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008
 Estimate Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 18,840 20,603 1,763 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,075 -28,341 -1,266 
Net Transfers 
 
-600 
 
-600 
 
0 
 
Balance on Current Account -8,835 -8,338 497 
as % of GNP         -5.6            -5.1 0.5 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2009 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Forecast Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 95,754 100,596 4,842 3,112 5.1 1.8 3.3 
Public Net Current Expenditure 30,449 33,037 2,588 1,066 8.5 4.8 3.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 44,728 46,086 1,358 4 3.0 1.0 0.0 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 157,876 168,549 10,672 9,049 6.8 1.0 5.7 
Physical Changes in Stocks 531 425 -106 0    
       
Final Demand 329,338 348,693 19,355 13,325 5.9 1.8 4.0 
less:       
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 137,273 146,635 9,361 7,281 6.8 1.4 5.3 
less:       
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -33    
       
GDP at Market Prices 193,076 203,069  9,993 6,077 5.2 2.0 3.1 
less:       
Net Factor Payments (F) -28,341 -29,983 -1,643 -1,141 5.8 1.7 4.0 
       
GNP at Market Prices 164,735 173,086  8,351 4,913 5.1 2.0 3.0 
        
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,324 3,391  66 2.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 82,073 85,964 3,891 4.7 
  Other: 64,296 67,820 3,524 5.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200   
         Statistical .. 
                             Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011   
     
Net Domestic Product 148,482 155,963 7481 5.0 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -28,341 -29,983 -1,643 5.8 
     
National Income 120,141 125,980 5,839 4.9 
Depreciation 20,832 22,013 1,181 5.7 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 140,973 147,993 7,020 5.0 
Taxes less Subsidies 23,762 25,093 1,331 5.6 
     
GNP at Market Prices 164,735 173,086 8,351 5.1 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2008 2009 Change in 2009 
 Forecast Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 20,603 21,914 1,311 
Net Factor Payments (F) -28,341 -29,983 -1,643 
Net Transfers -600 -600 0 
    
Balance on Current Account -8,338 -8,669 -332 
as % of GNP         -5.1 -5.0             0.1 
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 THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY1
The main developments in the international economy can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
• Growth prospects in the major economies have worsened for 2008 as 
the impacts of the credit crisis have become more apparent, but the 
downturn is expected to be short lived. 
• Growth in the Euro Area is expected to moderate in 2008 to 1.8 per 
cent and improve to 2 per cent in 2009. Inflationary pressures remain 
high but are likely to moderate this year. We assume the ECB main 
refinancing rate will be 3.75 per cent by year end. 
• Tighter credit conditions in the UK are likely to depress consumer 
spending and investment this year, causing real GDP growth to slow 
to 1.8 per cent, but a weaker sterling is expected to improve exports 
and overall growth in 2009. 
• The US economy is forecast to grow by 1.5 per cent as consumer 
spending weakens and housing investment falls as credit conditions 
worsen. Further interest rate cuts and the planned fiscal stimulus are 
expected to contribute to the US avoiding a prolonged recession, with 
growth of 1.9 per cent expected in 2009. 
• Prices for oil and food, which have increased sharply in recent 
months are expected to moderate, leading to an easing of inflationary 
pressures globally. 
• The euro is expected to strengthen against the US dollar and sterling 
in 2008, but remain stable in 2009. 
 
 The strong pace of economic growth in the Euro Area in 2006 appears to 
have continued into 2007, with real GDP growth for last year now estimated 
at 2.7 per cent. It seems increasingly unlikely that the Euro Area will fully 
avoid the wider consequences of the turmoil on international financial 
markets, and in particular the anticipated slowdown in the US economy in 
2008. We expect growth to fall to 1.8 per cent this year. Exports and 
investment supported growth in 2007 but it is expected that falling 
unemployment and an increase in wages will help stimulate domestic 
consumption growth, making it the driver of real GDP growth in 2008. A 
potential offsetting effect is the tightening credit conditions faced by 
European households and businesses. The latest Euro Area Bank Lending 
Survey (ECB, January 2008) suggests that banks significantly tightened their 
credit standards in the final quarter of 2007 and were expecting similar 
tightening in the first quarter of 2008. The continuing appreciation of the 
Euro Area 
 
1 We are grateful to Adele Bergin for assistance in compiling the International forecasts. 
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euro against the US dollar and sterling is expected to contribute to export 
growth easing over our forecast horizon. 
 
For 2009 we expect real GDP growth to rise to 2 per cent. This is 
accompanied by a further fall in unemployment to 6.8 per cent and an 
improvement in real wage growth as consumer price inflation moderates. 
Inflation as measured by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index was estimated at 
3.2 per cent in January, well above the ECB’s target of close to but below 2 
per cent, primarily as a result of higher commodity prices. It is expected that 
these inflationary pressures will ease as commodity price growth moderates in 
the second half of 2008. The strengthening of the euro and the general 
slowdown in economic growth should also help to stem inflation. However, 
the ECB President Jean Claude Trichet has consistently warned that the 
current high level of inflation must not become anchored in inflation 
expectations and feed through to wage demands. If these so-called “second 
round effects” were to materialise, it is possible that the ECB would not 
loosen monetary policy. For our forecasts we have made a technical 
assumption of a 25 basis points cut in the ECB main refinancing rate from 4 
per cent (Figure 1) to 3.75 per cent in September 2008. Our assumption is 
dependent on wage increases in the major Euro Area economies, particularly 
Germany, remaining below the currently high rate of inflation and that 
commodity prices stabilise this year. It must be noted that in the current 
climate it is important to monitor developments in the inter-bank lending 
rates, such as Euribor, given their potential impact on credit availability. 
 
Turning to the prospects for the larger Euro Area economies, German real 
GDP growth is estimated at 2.6 per cent for 2007. The prospects for the 
German economy this year and next mirror those for the Euro Area as a 
whole. Growth is expected to fall to 1.6 per cent in 2008 as a weaker export 
performance this year acts as a drag on overall activity. Offsetting this is the 
continuing increase in domestic demand, with personal consumption 
expected to pick up marginally as unemployment falls to 7.8 per cent and 
earnings grow by 2.5 per cent. Inflation, which is currently running at the 
highest rate in 14 years, is expected to moderate as oil and food prices 
stabilise. In 2009 real GDP growth is forecast to return to trend of about 2 
per cent. 
 
The French economy is estimated to have grown by 1.9 per cent in 2007. 
This  performance is likely to continue in 2008, as both domestic and external 
demand growth is expected to fall. We anticipate real GDP growth of 1.7 per 
cent in 2008. Marginal improvements in employment are expected this year, 
but personal consumption growth is expected to remain subdued as higher 
prices offset increases in wages. With the government maintaining a more 
prudent fiscal stance, the budget deficit is expected to remain stable over the 
forecast horizon. The forecast for real GDP growth in 2009 is 1.9 per cent, 
primarily as a result of a slight increase in private investment growth. 
 
For 2007 the Italian economy is estimated to have grown by 1.8 per cent, 
driven by increases in personal consumption primarily due to improved 
labour market conditions. Export activity slowed significantly towards the end 
of 2007, and this is likely to continue in 2008. A moderate increase in 
consumer prices is expected to dampen consumption growth this year. 
Coupled with lacklustre investment growth, real GDP growth is expected to 
fall to 1.3 per cent in 2008. While export growth is expected to recover 
somewhat in 2009, it is not sufficient to increase overall economic growth, 
which we expect to remain at 1.3 per cent next year. 
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 Figure 1: Interest Rates* 
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*Mortgage rate used is the Irish Representative Building Societies Mortgage Rate.  
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
 Real GDP is estimated to have grown by 3.1 per cent in the UK in 2007. 
Much of that growth was concentrated in the first half of the year, with a 
significant slowdown in activity recorded in the last three months of 2007. 
Growth in 2007 was mostly driven by domestic demand. However, as the 
year came to an end, the ongoing correction in the housing market and the 
wider effects of the credit crunch began to limit investment and consumer 
spending growth. Survey evidence from the Bank of England (BoE) suggests 
that, although the spread between inter-bank lending rates and the main BoE 
policy rate has fallen, banks have tightened credit conditions for their 
customers. This is likely to further depress consumer spending and business 
investment in 2008. As a result overall economic growth is forecast to slow to 
1.8 per cent this year with unemployment rising to 5.8 per cent. 
United 
Kingdom 
 
In 2009 real GDP growth is expected to rise to 2.2 per cent. The 
improvement next year is partly due to an increase in exports as the 
depreciation in sterling makes UK goods and services more competitive. A 
weaker sterling exchange rate (Figure 2) contributes to import prices being 
higher for much of 2008, which is expected to lead to higher inflation. In its 
latest Inflation Report (February, 2008) the BoE acknowledged that inflation 
will rise sharply in the near term alongside a significant slowing in economic 
growth. However, commodity prices are expected to stabilise towards the end 
of 2008, so that it is likely that monetary policy will be further eased. 
Unemployment is expected to increase marginally in 2009 to 5.9 per cent. 
 
 In 2007 the US economy grew by an estimated 2.2 per cent. Personal 
consumption growth and a robust increase in non-residential construction 
were the main drivers of growth last year. The correction in the housing 
market deepened, as residential construction output and housing transactions 
fell sharply. The wider effects of the credit market turmoil as a result of the 
sub-prime crisis are expected to weigh heavily on growth in 2008. We 
anticipate  real  GDP  growth  will  fall  to 1.5  per  cent  in  2008,  with  the 
likelihood of the US being technically in recession during the year, i.e. two 
United States 
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successive quarters with a fall in real output. Unemployment is expected to 
rise to 5.5 per cent in 2008 as tighter credit conditions and rising inflation 
constrain domestic demand. 
Figure 2: Exchange Rates 
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Source: Central Bank & Financial Services Authority of Ireland (historic) and National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) (forecast). 
 
A number of mitigating factors are expected to prevent the US from 
remaining in recession beyond the end of this year. First, the $168 billion 
fiscal stimulus proposed by the Bush administration and recently approved by 
Congress should contribute to stimulating demand, particularly business 
investment in 2009. Second, the Federal Reserve has publicly maintained its 
view that risks to economic growth remain firmly on the downside and it is 
willing to loosen monetary policy significantly in the coming months. This is 
despite the current rise in consumer price inflation driven by elevated 
commodity prices. Third, the expected depreciation of the US dollar in 2008 
should help support export growth this year and next, which will contribute 
to the US current account deficit narrowing to a forecast -4 per cent of GDP 
in 2009. We expect real GDP growth to increase to 1.9 per cent in 2009. 
However, the impact of the recovery will take time to materialise as earnings 
growth is anticipated to be low at 2 per cent and unemployment is expected 
to increase to 6.3 per cent. 
 
While risks to growth remain on the downside, risks to inflation are still on 
the upside. Should commodity prices fail to stabilise in 2008, there remains a 
danger that inflation expectations would rise above the Federal Reserve’s 
preferred level of 2 per cent. This would particularly be the case if interest 
rates were cut too aggressively in attempts to promote economic growth. US 
policymakers may face a difficult balancing act as 2008 progresses to help 
avoid stagflation and a longer period in recession. 
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 Table 1: Short-term International Outlook  
                
 Real GDP Growth Consumer Price  
Inflation* 
Average Earnings 
Growth 
Unemployment Rate 
 
Current Account Balance 
          % of Labour Force % of GDP 
                
Country 2007    2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008    2009 
                
UK 3.1 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.0 3.7 4.5 3.8 5.4 5.8 5.9 -4.8 -4.1 -3.2 
Germany 2.6 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.1 1.5 1.6 2.5 2.0 8.4 7.8 7.3 6.1 4.5 4.4 
France 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.6 2.9 2.3 3.0 3.4 2.7 8.3 8.0 8.1 -0.8 -1.8 -2.2 
Italy 1.8 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.7 2.4 6.0 6.1 6.1 -2.9 -2.7 -2.4 
                
Euro Area 2.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.0    7.4 7.0 6.8 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 
USA 2.2 1.5 1.9 2.9 3.7 2.1 4.5 4.0 2.0 4.6 5.5 6.3 -5.5 -4.9 -4.0 
Japan 1.9 1.6 1.7  0.0  0.0 0.2 -0.2 2.0 2.2 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.7 4.5 4.7 
China 11.3 10.3 10.0 4.8 5.2 5.6       11.2  9.7  9.4 
                
                
Ireland 4.9 1.8 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.5 5.5 4.0 3.5 4.6 6.0 6.2 -4.7 -4.3 -4.3 
                
Source: NIESR. 
* HICP for Euro Area countries and the UK, CPI otherwise. 
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 The Japanese economy is estimated to have grown by 1.9 per cent in 2007. 
Much of this growth is accounted for by a strong export performance. A 
significant  slowdown  in  construction  activity  in  the  second half of 2007 is 
likely to continue into 2008. Combined with continued stagnation in personal 
consumption growth, this suggests domestic demand is unlikely to support 
economic  growth  to  any  great  extent  over  our  forecast  horizon. Despite 
unemployment falling to 3.8 per cent in 2007, a level it is expected to 
maintain in 2008, earnings actually fell by 0.2 per cent last year. While 
earnings growth is expected to pick up in 2008 and 2009, by 2 per cent and 
2.2 per cent respectively, the worsening international scenario is likely to 
curtail export growth and thus real GDP growth. We expect the Japanese 
economy to expand by 1.6 per cent in 2008 and 1.7 per cent in 2009. Against 
this backdrop, consumer prices are expected to grow only marginally in 2008 
and 2009, and consequently the Bank of Japan will be reluctant to increase its 
main policy interest rate above the current level of 0.5 per cent. 
Asia 
 
China continues to benefit from double-digit rates of real GDP growth, 
with estimates for 2007 showing the economy grew by 11.3 per cent last year. 
Exports remained an important component in overall economic growth, with 
the trade surplus increasing by 48 per cent in 2007. However, domestic 
demand has also increased significantly. Indications that export growth may 
have begun to slow as 2007 came to an end do not suggest any dramatic 
reduction in Chinese economic growth over our forecast horizon. Real GDP 
is forecast to increase by 10.3 per cent in 2008 and 10 per cent in 2009. 
Inflation remains a concern for Chinese policymakers, and despite the 
People’s Bank of China continued tightening of monetary policy, price 
pressures remain a key indicator of an overheating economy. The continued, 
albeit less restrictive, pegging of the Chinese renminbi to the US dollar 
effectively implies China is importing US inflation. Allowing a more rapid 
appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar would contribute more 
positively to the central bank’s desire to curb inflationary pressures. 
 
 The prospects for growth in Ireland’s main trading partners in 2008 have 
significantly worsened since our previous Commentary. Combined with these 
developments the euro has appreciated strongly against both the US dollar 
and sterling. Meanwhile, the sharp increases in commodity prices are causing 
inflationary pressures to emerge across the globe. Both food and oil prices 
have seen sharp increases in recent months. Most commentators expect 
commodity prices to stabilise in 2008. 
International 
Context for 
Ireland 
 
The effects of the credit crunch on the broader international economy are 
beginning to become apparent. Some commentators had believed that the 
Euro Area and emerging economies would escape much of the negative 
impact of slower US growth in 2008. While it is the case that the global 
economy is less reliant on the US than before, the so-called “decoupling 
hypothesis”2 was unlikely to hold to any great extent. This is particularly the 
case for a country such as Ireland, which has extremely close trade and 
investment linkages with the US. 
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2 Decoupling refers to the ability of the Asian and European economies to withstand a 
significant reduction in US economic growth without any major impact on their own 
economic performance. See the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, April 
2007, for a more detailed appraisal. 
 Our forecast is that the current downturn in the global economy will be 
short lived. Given the pro-active stance that the Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of England have taken on cutting interest rates, and the likelihood of 
further interest rate cuts in both jurisdictions, it is likely that growth in the US 
and the UK will improve in 2009. The fiscal stimulus budgeted for in the US 
should also contribute to growth prospects there improving next year, and 
improving Ireland’s export growth potential along with it. The ECB may also 
begin loosening monetary policy, which should stimulate growth in 2009 and 
help curb the strengthening of the euro. It remains important, however, that 
fiscal and monetary policy avoid encouraging currently high rates of inflation 
globally to become entrenched in inflation expectations. If this happens and a 
period of stagflation takes hold, the adjustment period out of the current 
downturn could take longer. 
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 THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
 
 The downward revision of prospects for 2008 that characterised recent 
Commentaries continues. Expectations of significant contractions in house 
building in 2008 have been compounded by a downward trend in consumer 
confidence. This is related in part to growing concerns regarding the health of 
the US economy and, by extension, to growing concerns about the world 
economy. For 2008, we now expect GNP growth of 1.6 per cent and GDP 
growth of 1.8 per cent. Investment is expected to contract by 7.4 per cent, 
thereby placing a large drag on growth. As a result of the low growth, no 
employment growth is expected in 2008 and the rate of unemployment is 
expect to rise to 6 per cent. 
General 
 
For 2009, we expect an improvement in the growth performance. Partly as 
a result of an anticipated improvement in the international environment and a 
levelling off in house building, we expect GNP growth to be 3 per cent in 
2008 with GDP growth of 3.1 per cent. While employment growth will 
resume (with a net increase of 23,000 expected), the rate of unemployment 
will move slightly upwards again to 6.2 per cent. Part of our expectation for 
2009 is based on the anticipation that services exports will continue to 
perform well and thereby facilitate on-going growth in the services sector. 
 
 Consumption grew strongly in 2007 and we estimate that the growth rate 
for the year will have been 6.5 per cent. This is based partly on the most 
recent Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) and also on the most recent Retail 
Sales Index (RSI). According to the QNA, consumption was growing at a rate 
of 6 per cent in the year ended 2007 Q3 (Figure 3). The RSI grew by 6.5 per 
cent in volume terms in 2007. Observed growth in the overall RSI may 
sometimes be distorted by the motor trade but this is not the case for 2007. 
Excluding the motor trade, the RSI growth was 6.4 per cent. 
Consumption 
 
Looking ahead to 2008, it is clear that consumption growth will be 
significantly  lower and for several reasons. First, now that the SSIA effect has 
largely moved through the economy, this once-off boost to consumption in 
2007 will not be present in 2008. Second, the latest reading of the IIB/ESRI 
Consumer Sentiment Index shows a continuation of the downward trend that was 
experienced throughout much of 2007 (Figure 4). The February reading of 
63.5 was down on the January figure of 67, but more significantly, was well 
down on the 2007 average reading of 77.2. This downward trend in sentiment 
is, of course, related in part to developments in the economy that will 
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 themselves tend to impact negatively on consumption growth. Of these, the 
stagnation in employment is the most important. 
Figure 3: Growth in Consumption and Retail Sales 
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Based on these considerations, we expect consumption in 2008 to grow by 
3 per cent in volume terms and by 5.3 per cent in value terms. To get a sense 
of where this downturn is coming from, it is useful to draw on our 
projections for incomes, presented in greater detail below. For 2007, we 
estimate that gross personal income grew by 9.3 per cent in nominal terms. 
The corresponding figure for 2008 is forecast to be just 5.1 per cent again in 
nominal terms, with the difference between the two being largely explained by 
the different rates of employment growth. For 2009, we expect a modest 
rebound in consumption growth and forecast a growth rate of 3.3 per cent in 
real terms as employment growth resumes and consumer confidence 
improves. 
Figure 4: IIB/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index 
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 According to the 
in the year ended in that quarter. This represented a deceleration from the 
corresponding figure of 7.1 per cent in the previous quarter. Given this 
trajectory, we estimate that investment grew by 1.5 per cent in 2007, down on 
the 2006 figure of 3.1 per cent. It can be seen from Table 2, however, that 
this aggregate figure for investment growth in 2007 hides vastly different 
trends across housing, other building, and machinery and equipment.  
 
QNA for 2007 Q3, investment had grown by 3.5 per cent 
The contraction in housing investment has been discussed extensively in 
pre
In 2008, house completions remain a crucial variable for the forecast of 
ov
With growth in other building forecast to remain buoyant at 12 per cent, 
bu
ooking ahead to 2009, although the bulk of the adjustment in housing 
ou
 
Investment 
vious Commentaries because of its large impact on both the investment 
growth figure and on the growth figures for GNP and GDP. It now appears 
that housing investment contracted by 9.3 per cent in volume terms in 2007, 
beginning a process of adjustment whereby housing output will return to 
long-run sustainable levels. House completions are estimated to have been 
78,028 in 2007, a fall of around 10,000 on the 2006 figure and of around 
15,000 on the peak of 93,000 recorded in the year ended Q3 2006. In 
contrast, other building is estimated to have grown by 12 per cent in volume 
terms in 2007 due to the National Development Plan and buoyancy in the 
commercial building sector. Investment in machinery and equipment is also 
estimated to have grown strongly, at a rate of 13 per cent. 
 
erall economic growth. House registrations were recorded at 37,878 for the 
year ended December 2007, down from 45,175 for the year ending in the 
previous quarter and also down from 66,649 in the year ended December 
2006. With data on commencements showing a similar move, we now expect 
50,000 house completions in 2008. This will translate into a percentage 
volume fall of 29.3 per cent.3
 
ilding and construction in total is forecast to register a volume contraction 
of 12.3 per cent in 2008. In spite of forecast growth of 8 per cent in 
investment in machinery and equipment, total investment is forecast to fall by 
7.4 per cent in volume terms this year. 
 
L
tput is expected to have occurred in 2008, our forecasts include a further, 
more modest decline in housing output in 2009. For 2009, we expect 45,000 
house completions, 5,000 below our expectation for 2008. We also expect 
slower growth in other building in 2009 (at 2 per cent) relative to 2008 (at 12 
per cent). This is based on an expectation that the slowdown in 2008 will 
have an impact on the commencement of retail and commercial 
developments in 2008 and hence on completions in 2009. With investment in 
machinery and equipment forecast to grow at a rate of 6 per cent, total 
investment is expected to register zero growth in 2009. 
 
3 With regard to house prices, we believe that prices in the early part of 2008 will be recorded 
as being 15 per cent below their value in December 2006 when  fully up-to-date data become 
available. The permanent tsb/ESRI index has shown a fall of 8 per cent between December 
2006 and January 2008 but the January figures relate to transactions completed in October/ 
November 2007. For 2008 and 2009, we expect generally stable house prices. 
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 Table 2: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 
           
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value      €m Volume Value €m 
           
Housing 23,221 -9.3 -10.8 20,722 -29.3 -28.8 14,750 -7.1 -3.7 14,203 
           
Other Building 13,216  12.0 18.2 15,616 12.0 17.0 18,278  2.0  5.6 19,296 
           
Building and   
Construction 36,438 -1.6 -0.3 36,339 -12.3 -9.1 33,028 -2.3  1.4 33,498 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment  9,589 13.0 11.3 10,673 8.0 9.6 11,700 6.0 7.6 12,588 
           
Total 46,027 1.5 2.1 47,012 -7.4 -4.9 44,728 0.0 3.0 46,086 
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 Figure 5: Housing Statistics 
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 The second set of monthly Exchequer returns for 2008 showed that the 
overall tax-take in the first two months of 2008 was 8.3 per cent below the 
figure for the first two months of 2007. While care should be taken not to 
read too much into this figure, the fall in stamp duties collected in January 
and February 2008 relative to January and February 2007 (44 per cent) is yet 
another indicator of the rapid slowdown in the property sector in the 
economy. Furthermore, falls in VAT and CGT tax take relative to the same 
period in 2007 are also in line with the apparent slowing in the economy. 
Government 
Spending 
and the 
Public 
Finances 
 
Our growth forecasts for 2008 are now slipping well below the 
Department of Finance’s Budget Day forecasts of GNP growth of 2.8 per 
cent and GDP growth of 3 per cent. In this context, the question arises of 
what the public finance outturn is likely to be in 2008 relative to official 
Budget Day forecasts.  
 
Before addressing this question, it is important that we state explicitly how 
we arrive at our forecasts for the public finances. For 2008, we use official 
Budget Day forecasts of current and capital expenditure. However, our 
forecast of tax revenue differs from the official Budget Day figures because 
we use our own tax forecasting model. For 2009, we again use official figures 
for capital spending but provide our own forecast of current expenditure. We 
do so because the level of current spending for 2009 is decided upon in late 
2008 and so any figure that appears in official documents before then is more 
of a technical assumption than a forecast. Plans for capital spending are 
generally less subject to change and so we take the official figures. For 2009, 
our tax revenue for forecasts are based on our own tax forecasting model. 
 
For 2008, we now expect a General Government deficit equal to 1.2 per 
cent of GDP. The official forecast was for a General Government deficit of 
0.9 per cent so, on our calculations, it appears that the outturn will be poorer 
than had been anticipated in the Budget. The discrepancy between our 
forecast for economic growth and that of the Department of Finance is 
greater than the discrepancy between our forecasts for the General 
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 Government balance. The reason for this is that we use a higher tax elasticity 
with respect to economic growth relative to that used by the Department of 
Finance, as discussed in the previous Commentary. 
 
These figures imply that the turnaround in the public finances since 2006 
is now larger than previously estimated. A General Government surplus of 
2.9 per cent of GDP was recorded in that year.  If the forecast of a General 
Government deficit of 1.2 per cent of GDP is realised this year, the 
turnaround will be over 4 percentage points. As discussed in the previous 
Commentary, this in itself is not a concern if it represents a short-term response 
to an economic downturn. However, our forecasts for the public finances in 
2009 point to the challenge of bringing the public finances back to a more 
sustainable trajectory. 
 
For 2009, we have adopted a technical assumption that voted current 
expenditure will grow at a rate of 7.5 per cent, below the 2008 figure of 9.3 
per cent and the 2007 figure of 12.3 per cent. With current revenues forecast 
to grow by only 3.7 per cent, the General Government deficit is forecast to 
widen further to 2 per cent of GDP in 2009. On the basis of these figures, the 
gross national debt as a percentage of GDP would rise from 25.1 per cent in 
2006 to just under 30 per cent in 2009. While this would still be a low debt to 
GDP ratio by both historic and international standards, it is the prospect of it 
increasing at such a pace that is a concern.  
Table 3: Public Finances 
        
 2006  
€m 
Change 
% 
2007 
€m 
% 
Change 
2008 
€m 
% 
Change 
2009 
€m 
        
Current Revenue 46,145 3.8 47,887 2.6 49,121 3.7 50,941 
Current Expenditure 37,077 10.3 40,890  9.6 44,827 7.7 48,276 
   of which: Voted 32,915 12.3 36,959  9.3 40,390 7.5 43,419 
        
Current Surplus 9,068 -22.8 6,997 -38.6 4,294 -37.9 2,665 
        
Capital Receipts 1,871 -24.7 1,408    3.4 1,456 4.1 1,516 
Capital Expenditure 8,675 15.5 10,024 10.6 11,089 5.6 11,706 
   of which: Voted 6,476 18.1 7,650 11.9  8,562  5.5 9,032 
        
Capital Borrowing -6,804 26.6 -8,616 11.8 -9,633  5.8 -10,190 
        
Exchequer Balance 2,264.3  1,618.6  -5,339.1  -7,525.4 
 as % of GNP 1.5  -1.0  -3.2  -4.3 
         
General Government 
Balance 5,107.3  903.7   -2,319.0  -4,110.7 
 as % of GDP 2.9  0.5  -1.2  -2.0 
        
Gross Debt as % of GDP 25.1  25.3  27.2  29.6 
        
Net Debt as % of GDP* 12.7  12.1   11.8  12.2 
        
*Net of pensions fund and Social Insurance Fund. 
 
If we were to use the figure for voted current expenditure growth for 2009 
presented by the Department of Finance in Budget 2008, the projected 
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 General Government deficit for 2009 is lower than our forecasts. The figure 
presented by the Department is 5.2 per cent (our figure is 7.5 per cent);4 our 
calculations suggest that the General Government deficit would be 1.6 per 
cent of GDP were current spending growth to be at that lower rate. Hence, 
even if we use the lower figure for growth in current public spending in 2009, 
the public finances will deteriorate in 2009 relative to 2008. We return to this 
issue in the General Assessment below. 
 
 The latest available data suggest that 2007 saw an improved performance in 
exports compared to that of the previous year. According to the Quarterly 
National Accounts for 2007 Q3, growth in the volume of exports of goods and 
services was 6.5 per cent on an annual basis. This compared with the 4.4 per 
cent growth recorded for 2006, and the growth appeared to be accelerating as 
2007 progressed. While the growth to 2007 Q3 was dominated by the rapid 
expansion in services exports, which grew at 13.1 per cent in volume terms, 
merchandise export growth improved dramatically, increasing to 2.4 per cent 
in 2007 Q3 compared to 0.8 per cent for 2006. We estimate export volume 
growth of 6.6 per cent for 2007 as a whole, with the equivalent value measure 
being 6.3 per cent. 
Exports 
 
Following a disappointing year in 2006, merchandise export growth in 
2007 is estimated to have increased markedly, with our estimate of volume 
growth for the year being 3.4 per cent. The growth in the volume of 
merchandise exports was particularly strong in 2007 Q2 and Q3. By contrast 
growth in the value of merchandise exports seems to have stagnated, 
reflecting the ongoing fall in export prices. According to the Balance of 
Payments, which only provides data in current prices, growth in the value of 
merchandise exports has remained low, with no growth in value recorded for 
the year ending 2007 Q3, while data from the latest External Trade Statistics 
estimate that the value of merchandise exports actually fell in December. 
Merchandise export prices are expected to continue falling over our forecast 
horizon as the Wholesale Price Index for manufacturing, a leading indicator of 
export prices, has maintained its downward trend. Consequently, our forecast 
for the growth in the value of merchandise exports remains below that of 
volume growth in 2008 and 2009, at 2 per cent and 2.5 per cent respectively 
in both years. 
 
Overall export growth continues to be driven by the growth in services 
exports, which now account for over 40 per cent of total exports. Our 
forecasts suggest that 47 per cent of total exports in 2009 will be services. For 
the year ending 2007 Q3 services exports grew by 15.9 per cent in value 
terms. Balance of Payments data suggest that much of that growth was 
concentrated in financial services and business services, which grew by 19.7 
per cent and 29.5 per cent respectively. We estimate that for 2007 as a whole 
services exports grew by 14.5 per cent in value terms, with non-tourism 
services exports growing by 15 per cent and tourism exports growing by 9 per 
cent. Services export growth is expected to moderate in 2008, although still 
contributing more than merchandise to total export growth.  We estimate that  
 
4 We use this higher figure for growth in voted current expenditure in 2009 because we think 
it will be difficult for the Government to achieve a lower rate of growth, given political 
pressures, and a rise in spending that will result from the increase in unemployment. It is, of 
course, possible that the lower rate of growth will be achieved. 
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 Table 4: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 % Change in 2009 2009 
           
 €m Volume Value    €m Volume Value      €m Volume Value     €m 
           
Merchandise 83,355 3.4 0.8 84,022 2.5 2.0 85,702 2.5 2.0 87,416
Tourism 4,258 5.3  9.0 4,641 5.6  8.0 5,013 6.1 8.0 5,414
Other Services 50,793 12.0 15.0 58,412  9.8 12.0 65,421 10.3 12.8 73,763
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 138,406 6.6 6.3 147,075 5.4 6.2 156,136 5.7 6.7 166,592
           
FISIM Adjustment 1,360   1,558   1,740   1,956
           
Adjusted Exports 139,766 6.6 6.3 148,633 5.4 6.2 157,876 5.7 6.8 168,549
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 almost 80 per cent of the value growth in exports this year will be accounted 
for by services. Our forecast for non-tourism services growth in 2008 is 12 
per cent in value terms and 9.8 per cent in volume terms. Growth in the value 
of tourism exports is expected to decline to 8 per cent this year. For 2009 we 
anticipate growth in the value of non-tourism exports to improve slightly, 
rising to 12.8 per cent (10.3 per cent in volume terms). Tourism export 
growth in 2009 is expected to remain steady at 8 per cent in value terms; 
however, given the moderation in consumer price growth expected next year 
the equivalent volume measure increases to 6.1 per cent. 
 
Our estimates for overall export growth in 2007 have been revised 
upwards since our previous Commentary as the latest available data suggest a 
strong export performance in 2007 Q2 and Q3. However, the international 
environment has become increasingly difficult, with the Euro appreciating 
and economic growth in our main export markets slowing. Indicators suggest 
that a slowdown in export growth can be expected in 2008. Our forecast for 
the total volume growth in exports for 2008 is 5.4 per cent (6.2 per cent in 
value terms). Our expectation is that much of the current downturn in the 
international economy will be concentrated in 2008. As such we expect a 
slight increase in total export growth in 2009, to 5.7 per cent in volume terms 
and 6.8 per cent in value terms. The responsiveness of labour costs to the 
worsening employment situation domestically is key to our forecasts for 2009, 
as it implies an end to the deterioration in Ireland’s overall competitiveness. 
Figure 6: Exports and Imports Volume Growth Rates (Annual Averages) 
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 Data from the latest QNA suggest that the volume of imports of goods and 
services grew by 5.8 per cent in the year ending 2007 Q3. This is an 
acceleration on the growth experienced during 2006 of 4.4 per cent. We 
estimate that for 2007 as a whole imports grew by 6 per cent in volume terms 
and 7.3 per cent in value terms. According to the latest Balance of Payments 
data, the value of tourism imports grew by 15.1 per cent in the year ending 
2007 Q3. Our estimates for 2007 imply a 13 per cent growth rate for the 
value of tourism imports, alongside an 8 per cent increase in the value of non-
tourism services exports. Merchandise import growth for 2007 is estimated at 
6 per cent in value terms and 5 per cent in volume terms. 
Imports 
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 Table 5: Imports of Goods and Services   
        
        2006  % Change in 2007       2007  % Change in 2008       2008  % Change in 2009      2009 
           
       €m Volume Value        €m Volume Value       €m Volume Value       €m 
           
Merchandise 57,967 5.0 6.0 61,445 3.9 5.5 64,824 3.9 5.5 68,390 
Tourism 5,446 10.8 13.0 6,154 3.4  6.0 6,523 5.4 8.0 7,045 
Other Services 57,025 6.7 8.0 61,587 4.1 6.0 65,282 6.6 8.0 70,505 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 120,438 6.0 7.3 129,186 4.0 5.8 136,630 5.3 6.8 145,940 
           
FISIM Adjustment 559   607   643   695 
           
Adjusted Imports 120,997 6.0 7.3 129,793 4.0 5.8 137,273 5.3 6.8 146,635 
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 Merchandise import volume growth was estimated at 1.6 per cent in 2006 
by the CSO. In the year ended 2007 Q3 that growth had increased to 4.8 per 
cent. Looking across the various commodity groups, the External Trade 
Statistics estimate that some of the highest growth in the value of merchandise 
imports was found for food and beverages products, with growth for the year 
ending November 2007 of 10.4 per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively. 
Interestingly, the growth in the value of petroleum products only increased by 
1.3 per cent over the same period, despite the growth in the price of oil on 
international markets. 
 
The growth in the volume of services imports in 2006 is estimated at 7 per 
cent by the CSO. In 2007 Q3 that growth had moderated to 6.7 per cent, 
although it had increased substantially on Q2 growth of just 3.7 per cent on 
an annual average basis. As mentioned above, the Balance of Payments data 
suggests strong growth in tourism imports as 2007 progressed, with non-
tourism services being the main driver of services import growth. An increase 
in the growth of the value of trade-related business services of 11.6 per cent 
in the year ended 2007 Q3 also helped offset the continuing decline in 
computer services and financial services imports. 
 
For 2008 volume growth in imports of goods and services is forecast to 
slow to 4 per cent (5.8 per cent value), a further downward revision on our 
previous forecasts. This reflects the particularly sharp fall in the growth of 
personal consumption this year, which particularly impacts on services 
imports. Growth in non-tourism services imports is anticipated to fall to 4.1 
per cent (6 per cent value) while tourism import growth is anticipated to 
decline rapidly to 3.4 per cent (6 per cent value).  
 
The moderation in the growth of industry (excluding construction) in 2008 
and 2009 contributes to the volume of merchandise import growth easing to 
3.9 per cent in both years. In 2009 we anticipate growth in non-tourism 
services imports to return to 2007 levels, with tourism imports growth also 
increasing to 5.4 per cent (8 per cent value) as growth in personal 
consumption recovers somewhat. Overall, we expect volume growth in the 
imports of goods and services to be 5.3 per cent in 2009, with value growth 
of 6.3 per cent. 
 
 Our forecasts for merchandise imports and exports for 2008 and 2009 
imply a further narrowing of the merchandise trade balance this year and 
next, by 7.5 per cent and 8.9 per cent respectively. This follows an estimated 
narrowing of 11.1 per cent in 2007. Both volume and price developments 
contribute to this trend. The deterioration in the merchandise terms of trade 
is also expected to continue, as our forecasts suggest merchandise export 
prices will continue to fall alongside rising import prices. Meanwhile, the 
opposite pattern is emerging in relation to services trade. Not only is Ireland 
exporting more services in volume terms than in previous years, but the unit 
price of our services exports is growing faster than the unit price of our 
services imports implying continued improvement in our services terms of 
trade. We estimate that these factors contributed to the services trade deficit 
falling by 36.8 per cent in 2007, and that it will continue that trend in 2008 
and 2009. Indeed our forecasts suggest that Ireland will have a surplus in 
services trade next year. The strong performance from services is expected to 
compensate entirely for the contraction in the merchandise trade balance in 
2008 and 2009, leading to the first improvement in the trade balance since 
Balance of 
Payments 
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 2002. We now expect the trade balance to rise from an estimated 11.2 per 
cent of GNP in 2007 to 11.8 per cent of GNP in 2008 and 11.9 per cent of 
GNP in 2009. 
Table 6: Balance of Payments* 
        
     2006 Change     2007 Change     2008 Change     2009 
    €m %    €m %     €m %     €m 
        
Merchandise Trade  
Balance 25,388 -11.1 22,577 -7.5 20,878 -8.9 19,026
Service Trade Balance - 7,420 -36.8 -4,688 -70.7 -1,372 -218.6 1,626
 
Trade Balance in Goods 
and Services on 
Balance of Payments 
Basis 17,968 -0.4 17,889  9.0 19,506 5.9 20,653
% of GNP 12.0  11.2  11.8  11.9
 Total Debit Flows 84,651 26.7 107,269 16.2 124,618 16.8 145,572
 Total Credit Flows 59,870 35.5 81,146 20.0 97,375 20.0 116,850
Net Factor Flows  -24,781  5.4 -26,124 4.3 -27,244 5.4 -28,722
Net Current Transfers  -465  -600  -600  -600
 
Balance on Current 
Account -7,278  -8,835  -8,338  - 8,669
        
Capital Transfers 223  300  300  300
Effective Current Balance  -7,055  -8,535  -8,038  -8,369
% of GNP -4.7  -5.4  -4.9  -4.8 
     
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis.  
 
In relation to net factor flows, the latest Balance of Payments data estimate 
that the net factor income deficit widened by 3 per cent in the year ended 
2007 Q3. Credit flows increased by 31.7 per cent over the same period. Of 
these credit flows, portfolio and other investment income had the largest 
increase of 35.6 per cent. Direct investment income saw growth of 10.6 per 
cent, an improvement on early 2007 figures but well below the 30 per cent 
growth seen for the year 2006. Debit factor flows tend to be much more 
volatile, growing by 22.7 per cent in the year ending 2007 Q3. 
 
For 2007 we estimate that the net factor income deficit grew by 5.4 per 
cent. Our forecasts for 2008 and 2009 see net factor income grow by 4.3 per 
cent and 5.4 per cent respectively. There is a significant amount of uncertainty 
around these forecasts given the scale and volatility of the underlying flows. 
Together with our forecasts for the trade balance, this implies an effective 
current account balance equivalent to -5.4 per cent of GNP estimated for 
2007, improving in 2008 to -4.9 per cent of GNP and in 2009 to -4.8 per cent 
of GNP. 
 
 Based on our forecasts for the expenditure components, our forecast for 
GNP growth in 2008 is 1.6 per cent. As regards growth in GNP per capita, 
our forecasts suggest growth of 0.3 per cent. Clearly these figures are very low 
relative to recent experience and, if taken in isolation from our forecasts for 
2009, might have appeared to signal an end to Ireland’s recent history of 
economic growth being above that of our European neighbours. 
Measures of 
Growth 
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 However, the figures for 2009 show that a recovery is expected. We 
forecast GNP growth of 3 per cent and growth in GNP per capita of 1.9 per 
cent. With slower inward migration forecast for 2009 relative to 2008, the 
proportionate difference between growth in GNP and GNP per capita is 
lower. Although a recovery is anticipated in 2009, we do not foresee a return 
to the growth rates that were experienced for much of this decade. However, 
this steadier pace of economic growth is likely to be more sustainable. This 
point on sustainability is well illustrated by the figures in Table 7 on the 
proportion of housing investment in GNP. From its peak of 15.6 per cent in 
2006, we expect to see this falling to 8.2 per cent in 2009. 
Table 7: Measures of Growth 
 
Growth Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GNP 4.9 6.5 4.6 1.6 3.0 
GNP adjusted for Terms of Trade 3.8 4.5 3.2 0.7 2.5 
GNDI 3.7 4.0 3.1 0.7 2.5 
National Resources 3.6 4.0 3.1 0.7 2.5 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 2.6 3.8 2.0 0.3 1.9 
Consumption per capita (constant prices) 5.0 3.1 3.9 1.7 2.2 
Personal disposable income per capita 6.7 3.7 6.3 3.8 4.1 
Investment in Housing/GNP 15.5 15.6 13.0  9.0 8.2 
Investment/GNP 31.0 30.9 29.5 27.2 26.6 
      
 
 According to the Quarterly National Accounts for 2007 Q3, industry 
(including construction) grew by 5.7 per cent in the year ending in that 
quarter. As building and construction itself posted a growth rate of just 0.6 
per cent in that period, the performance for industry (excluding construction) 
was even more impressive with growth of 7.5 per cent. This strong 
performance of industry is also seen in the figures from the Industrial 
Production Index (IPI) and it appears that the performance was maintained into 
the final quarter. The index for all industries grew by 7.1 per cent in 2007, 
with manufacturing industries growing by 7.4 per cent. Based on these 
figures, we estimate that industry (excluding construction) will have grown by 
6 per cent in volume terms in 2007, although value growth will be lower due 
to price falls for manufactured goods. We estimate that construction itself will 
have experienced a contraction in 2007 (of 1.6 per cent in volume terms) and 
so industry in total is estimated to have registered growth of 3.9 per cent in 
volume terms last year. 
Sectoral 
Output 
 
It is useful to put the 2007 performance of manufacturing into its recent 
historic context and this is done in Figure 7. In the early part of the decade, 
manufacturing seemed to be on a path of decline. However, since 2004 the 
downward trend in growth has reversed and the recent performance has 
exceeded the expectations that would have existed in the middle part of the 
decade. The additional figures from the IPI suggest that the improved 
performance is very much concentrated in the modern sector as opposed to 
the traditional. For example, in 2007 the IPI for the modern sector grew by 
9.1 per cent; the corresponding rate for the traditional sector was 2.5 per cent. 
The pattern shown in Figure 7 could be the result of increases in activities 
that are classified as manufacturing but that are in reality more service in 
24 
 nature. We would need much detailed information to be more definitive on 
this point but it is an issue that should be explored more fully in the future. 
Figure 7: Annual Growth Rate in the Industrial Production Index for 
Manufacturing 
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Source: Industrial Production Index, CSO. 
 
For 2008, we see the non-construction side of industry growing by 3 per 
cent in volume terms. While this represents a solid performance, we do not 
see that the particularly strong performance of 2007 will be maintained partly 
because of the more challenging international context. For 2009, we also 
expect to see growth in this sector of 3 per cent. While the international 
context should improve, we think that the competitiveness losses suffered in 
recent years will make it difficult for manufacturing to take full advantage of 
the improved context. 
 
This solid performance will be offset to a degree by the on-going 
difficulties that we foresee for construction in 2008 and 2009. Building and 
construction is expected to contract by 12.3 per cent this year and by a further 
2.3 per cent in 2009. Overall, we expect industry to contract by almost 1 per 
cent in 2008 and to grow by 1.8 per cent in 2009. 
 
Growth in services in the year ended 2007 Q3 was 6.1 per cent in volume 
terms, according to the Quarterly National Accounts. The corresponding growth 
rates for the various sub-sectors were as follows: distribution, transport and 
communications, 6.5 per cent; public administration and defence, 2.2 per 
cent; other services (including rent), 6.3 per cent. For 2007 overall, we expect 
that services growth will have been 5.9 per cent, largely due to strong growth 
in the non-public elements. 
 
This strong performance by services should be seen in the context of 
increasing growth in non-tourism services exports, as discussed in the Exports 
section above. Non-tourism services exports are estimated to have grown by 
12 per cent in 2007. This follows growth of 10.7 per cent in 2006, 10.8 per 
cent in 2005 and 11.6 per cent in 2004. One interesting dimension of this 
performance is that it occurred in the context of Ireland’s loss of 
competitiveness. This suggests that the services side of Ireland’s exports may 
have been less sensitive to price-related competitiveness losses relative to 
25 
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Table 8: GDP by Sector    
        
 2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 Change 2009 
           
     €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Agriculture 3,918 -10.0  2.0 3,996 1.0 2.0 4,075 1.0 2.0 4,157 
           
Industry: 53,043 3.9 2.4 54,329 -0.9 -1.1 53,738 1.8 1.9 54,734 
Other Industry 37,906 6.0 3.5 39,233 3.0 2.0 40,018 3.0 2.0 40,818 
Building & Construction 15,137 -1.6 -0.3 15,096 -12.3 -9.1 13,720 -2.3  1.4 13,916 
           
Services: 96,417 5.9 10.0 106,092 3.4  6.1 112,511 4.3 6.7 120,097 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 5,485 2.5 7.0 5,869 1.0 4.5 6,133 1.0 3.0 6,317 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 23,075 5.0 6.6 24,592 2.0 3.8 25,521 2.0 3.8 26,487 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 67,857 6.4 11.5 75,631 4.1  6.9 80,857 5.4 8.0 87,293 
           
GDP at Factor Cost – 
output basis 153,378 4.8 7.2 164,416 1.9 3.6 170,325 3.4 5.1 178,987 
           
 
 merchandise exports or that services may have experienced higher 
productivity growth. Either way, the trend allows us to be somewhat 
optimistic about the potential of services exports in 2008 and 2009 and, by 
extension, about services output generally. 
 
For 2008, we expect output from the services sector to grow by 3.4 per 
cent in volume terms. This growth is driven by services other than public 
services and distribution, communications and transport. For 2009, we expect 
overall growth of 4.3 per cent in services, again led by other services, for 
which growth of 5.4 per cent is expected. 
 
For agriculture, positive price developments should see the value of 
output growth exceeding that of volume growth in both 2008 and 2009. 
However, growth rates are expected to be modest at 1 per cent in volume 
terms and 2 per cent in value terms in both years. 
 
 The Quarterly National Household Survey for Q4 2007 showed that 
employment (when seasonally adjusted) grew by 67,800 in the year ending 
November 2007, an amount equal to 3.3 per cent. As employment had grown 
by close to 90,000 in each of 2006 and 2007, it seems clear that the rate of 
growth in employment is now easing. As regards the sectoral breakdown of 
employment change, the biggest increase in both absolute numbers and in 
proportionate terms was in wholesale and retail. Employment in this sector 
grew by almost 24,000 or by 8.2 per cent. The next biggest increase, again in 
both absolute and proportionate terms, was for financial and other business 
services, where employment grew by 21,000 (or by 7.6 per cent). Construction 
posted a decrease of 5,500 jobs (or almost 2 per cent), a trend that was 
unsurprising given broader developments in that sector. 
Employment 
 
The apparent weakening in the labour market is also evident from the 
FÁS/ESRI Employment and Vacancies Report. As shown in Figure 8, in January 
the Net Employment Expectations indicator showed a reading of -11 per 
cent. This can be interpreted as suggesting that the percentage of employers 
expecting a decline in employment in their firms is 11 percentage points 
higher than those expecting an increase. More tellingly, the index has been on 
a downward trajectory since April of last year and is now recording levels that 
are equal to the low points of August 2003 and November 2004. At both of 
those points, the index showed a fairly rapid turnaround but we are less 
confident that this will occur now. 
 
Turning to our forecasts, with economic growth for 2008 now forecast to 
be well below 2 per cent, the stark implication for employment is that we 
envisage no growth this year. When combined with anticipated growth in the 
labour force, this implies that the unemployment rate will rise to 6 per cent. 
We expect that net inward migration will decline rapidly in 2008 relative to 
2007 (down to 20,000 from close to 70,000.5  
 
For 2009, the pick-up in economic growth is expected to translate into an 
increase of 23,000 jobs (or 1.1 per cent). As this is a relatively modest rate of 
employment growth, the rate of unemployment is expected to move up 
 
5 This is already evident in the slowdown in PPS numbers issued in recent months. 
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 slightly again in 2009, to 6.2 per cent. This rate is based on the expectation 
that net inward migration will fall again in 2009, down to 10,000. 
Figure 8: The FÁS/ESRI Net Employment Expectations Index (and its 3 
Month Moving Average) 
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Source: FÁS/ESRI Employment and Vacancies Report, January 2008. 
 
As noted in previous Commentaries, the headline figures on employment 
growth hide a much more dynamic picture at a sectoral level. Although zero 
net employment growth is forecast for 2008, this consists of an extra 19,000 
jobs in services and 19,000 less in industry, including construction. For 2009, 
the net figure of 23,000 is made up of 29,000 added jobs in services and 6,000 
fewer jobs in industry, including construction. Underpinning our forecasts is a 
somewhat optimistic view of how those individuals losing jobs will be able to 
react, for example, through exiting the labour force, returning to home 
countries in the case of immigrants, or finding jobs in the areas of 
employment growth. Should this view prove to be overly optimistic, then our 
current forecast for the unemployment rate would rise. 
Table 9: Employment and Unemployment 
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2006 2007 2008    2009 
     
Agriculture 117 115 115 114 
Industry 560 569 550 544 
Services 1,362 1,416 1,435 1,464 
     
Total at Work 2,039 2,100 2,100 2,123 
Unemployed 93 102 135 141 
     
Labour Force 2,132 2,202 2,234 2,264 
Unemployment Rate % 4.4 4.6 6.0 6.2 
Net Migration 71.8 67.3 20.0 10.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 107.8 109.5 65.0 62.0 
Change in Participation Rate* 1.1 0.8 0.5 -0.2 
     
* Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years. 
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 As the CSO is in the process of replacing its sectoral surveys of earnings 
with the new Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS), our latest 
information on earnings growth comes partly from those existing sectoral 
surveys and partly from the EHECS. In Table 10, we present the latest 
figures on earnings growth by sector along with information on the source 
and time period. 
Incomes 
Table 10: Annual Wage Growth (Based on Weekly Earnings, Except for 
Construction Which is Hourly) 
Sector/Sub-sector Annual Wage 
Growth (%) 
For Year 
Ended 
Source 
Industry 5.9 2007 Q2 EHECS 
Of which:  
 
 
 Mining and Quarrying 
 
-1.3 
 
2007 Q2 
 
EHECS 
 Manufacturing 6.3 2007 Q2 EHECS 
 Electricity, Gas and Water 
 Supply 
 
4.6 
 
2007 Q2 
 
EHECS 
 
 
 
   
Financial Intermediation 11.7 2007 Q2 EHECS 
Construction 6.0 September 
2007 
Sectoral survey 
Distribution 3.9 September 
2007 
Sectoral survey 
Business Services 4.4 September 
2007 
Sectoral survey 
Public Sector 4.5 September 
2007 
Sectoral survey 
 
It is clear from Table 10 that wage growth in 2007 was buoyant. For the 
year as a whole, we estimate that wages will have grown by 5.5 per cent and, 
as a result, will have exceeded that of many of our trading partners. Given our 
forecast for a weakening in the labour market in 2008 and 2009, we expect 
nominal wage growth to be lower. For 2008, we expect nominal wages to 
grow by 4 per cent and by 3.5 per cent in 2009.  
 
One of the consequences of this easing in wage growth is that the 
deteriorating trend in wage-related competitiveness will be halted. This has 
been a matter of concern discussed in previous Commentaries. It can be seen 
from Figure 9 that labour’s share of GNP (one indicator of competitiveness) 
rose steadily from below 50 per cent in 2002 to 56 per cent in 2007. Our 
forecasts for 2008 and 2009 show this trend levelling off. Hence, while our 
forecasts do not show a reversal of the trend, they do suggest that the rising 
labour share seen in recent years may have ended.6
 
Given the zero rate of employment increase forecast for 2008 and the 
forecast for wage growth of 4 per cent, non-agricultural wage income is 
forecast to grow by 4 per cent. This represents a contrast with 2007 where 
our estimate for the corresponding figure is 9 per cent. Gross personal 
income is forecast to grow by 5.1 per cent in 2008, again a large decline from 
the 2007 value. We do not expect that the slowing of income growth will lead 
to a significant rise in borrowing, whereby people try to maintain 
consumption levels. Instead, we foresee consumption being adjusted and 
 
6 The increase in importance of knowledge-based services would tend to lead to an increase 
in labour’s share of GNP. Hence, all things being equal, we might have expected the line in 
Figure 8 to keep sloping upwards even in the absence of ongoing competitiveness losses. 
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 hence the savings rate staying essentially unchanged between 2007 and 2008 
at 6 per cent. 
Figure 9: Labour’s Share of GNP, 2002 to 2007 Plus Forecast Values for 
2008 and 2009 
 
For 2009, the pick-up in employment will add to non-agricultural wage 
income growth but we expect that this will be offset somewhat by lower 
earnings growth. Overall, non-agricultural wages are forecast to grow by 4.7 
per cent, with gross personal income forecast to rise by 5 per cent. Although 
our forecast for real consumption growth in 2009 is higher than that in 2008, 
our lower inflation forecast for 2009 implies lower growth in nominal 
consumption in 2009. This in turn contributes, in part, to our forecast for a 
slight rise in the savings rate between 2008 and 2009. 
 
 
 According to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), inflation for the year 2007 
averaged 4.9 per cent. This was the highest annual rate of inflation since 2001. 
In January 2008 the CPI registered a 4.3 per cent increase compared to the 
same month in 2007, slightly below that recorded in December 2007 of 4.7 
per cent. This slight moderation in consumer price inflation has contributed 
to the twelve month moving average inflation rate (Figure 10) falling, albeit 
marginally, for the first time since late 2005. 
Figure 10: CPI Inflation Rate 
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Table 11: Personal Disposable Income   
        
      2006 Change  2007 Change       2008 Change 2009 
           
        €m %    €m   €m %     €m          €m % €m €m 
           
Agriculture, etc. 3,195  2.0 64 3,259 2.0 65 3,324 2.0  66 3,391 
Non-Agricultural Wages 72,426 9.0 6,497 78,923 4.0 3,149 82,073 4.7 3,891 85,964 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 16,383 5.2 849 17,231 8.2 1,422 18,653  4.0 739 19,392 
           
Total Income Received 92,004 8.1 7,409 99,414 4.7 4,636  104,050 4.5 4,697 108,746 
Current Transfers 18,031 15.4 2,775 20,806  7.0 1,456 22,262 7.4 1,656 23,918 
           
Gross Personal Income 110,035 9.3 10,184 120,220 5.1  6,092 126,312 5.0 6,352 132,664 
Direct Personal Taxes 21,371 10.6 2,268 23,639  3.5   825 24,464 4.1 1,009 25,473 
           
Personal Disposable Income  88,665 8.9 7,916 96,581 5.5 5,267 101,848 5.2 5,343 107,191 
Consumption 82,483 10.2 8,436 90,919  5.3 4,835 95,754 5.1 4,842 100,596 
Personal Savings 6,181   5,662   6,094   6,595 
Savings Ratio  7.0    5.9   6.0   6.2 
Average Personal Tax Rate 19.4   19.7   19.4   19.2 
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The relatively high rate of inflation experienced during the twelve months 
ending July 2007 was primarily driven by the rise of the mortgage interest 
component of the CPI. Over 60 per cent of the annual rate of inflation 
recorded during the Summer of 2007 wa ge 
at  t increase its main 
re ancing rate n t n E te t increased since June of last 
year, the impact of the mortgage interest component on overall CPI inflation 
has diminish
cent of the inflation rate recorded in January 2008. Our forecasts are based on 
th chnical as ption 5 oi  in the ECB rate to 3.75 per 
emaining at that level for the remainder 
of r forecast horizon to the end of 2009.  
 
Inflationary pressures are now increasingly driven by the elevated prices 
for commodities such as food and oil since the Autumn of 2007. The 
evolution of food prices in recent mo hs reflects some potentially short-run 
ns  t  w ge creases in demand. The 
co n  increases in living ndards of emerging economies such as 
China and India are likely to lead to demand for basic foodstuffs to increase 
globally over the co  
price th sl ab  h al or a lengthy period of time, 
not the relatively concentrated spike in food price inflation seen in the last 
y-side shortages is more consistent with 
th rrent od . A  weather conditions globally 
in 20 av at st y
well below average. For the current high rate of food price inflation to 
continue throughout 2008, such weather conditions restricting supply would 
ha t e A  su ide issue is the increasing amount of 
l  u
While th ay reflect a longer-term trend, the added shortages as a result of 
weather conditions would have to continue for the coming year for food 
prices co n January 2008 
co  to Ja 00
 
 
si icantly  th e o n in r tional markets. Compared to 
Januar 0 t 
respectively in January 2008. While oil prices are likely to continue rising there 
r  numbe th will fall through 
 the 
l l no ea  sh use demand growth to slacken. Also 
lar has helped, and should 
 the feed through of increased oil prices on the 
CPI.  
Table 12: Inflation Measures (%) 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CPI 4.9 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.9 3.4 2.2 
Mortgage Interest 24.7 -7.6 -8.3 5.4 12.3 31.4 40.4 6.7 -5.7 
HICP (Ireland) 4.0 4.7 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.5 
HICP (Euro Area) 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.0 
          
 
 Using the EU Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)7 Ireland’s inflation 
rate remains above the Euro Area as a whole. Inflation as measured by HICP 
averaged 2.9 per cent for the twelve months ending January 2008 in Ireland. 
The comparable rate for the Euro Area was 2.3 per cent. 
 
With the forecast moderation in commodity prices and the assumption of 
an ECB interest rate cut, we anticipate the rate of inflation to fall in 2008, 
averaging 3.4 per cent for the year as measured by the CPI (2.9 per cent 
HICP). In 2009 we expect consumer price inflation to moderate further to 2.2 
per cent (2.5 per cent HICP). The projected fall of 5.7 per cent in the 
mortgage interest component of the CPI in 2009 contributes to that measure 
of inflation being below the HICP measure 8next year.  We expect Ireland to 
main above the Euro Area in terms of inflation in 2009, with the HICP 
inc
 
7 The HI exclud ort int  bu g m als, rete cks, on 
subscriptions, e, motor car tax d motorcycle 
8 For a de  discu  of eat  of gage rest  its i nce he 
CPI in Ireland see McCarthy, C. “Owner Occupied Housing Costs and Bias in the 
ish Consumer Price Index”, ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn 2007. 
re
reasing by 2 per cent for the currency bloc as whole next year, in line with 
the ECB’s target. 
 
Figure 11: Inflation Profile 2007-2009 (Forecast 2008M02 Onwards) 
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Source: Consumer Price Index, Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, CSO and own forecasts. 
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 GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
As we approach the end of the first quarter of 2008, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that 2008 will be a year of low economic growth relative to 
the recent past. The downturn in house building continues to explain much 
of this low growth and this had been anticipated for much of 2007. In the 
latter part of 2007 and into 2008, new factors have been added to the 
rom the 
ence, an 
appreciation in the euro, slowing growth in the United States and the on-
going problems on international financial markets, there have been few 
developments to offset the challenges that are confronting the Irish economy 
in 2008. 
 
This slow growth in 2008 will impact in a number of ways and these have 
been discussed above. Employment will stagnate this year and, as a result, the 
rate of unemployment is forecast to rise to 6 per cent, up from 4.6 per cent in 
2007. The public finances will slip deeper into deficit. Our estimates suggest 
that the General Government deficit will reach 1.2 per cent of GDP this year, 
compared to the Government’s Budget Day forecast of 0.9 per cent.  
 
For 2009, our forecasts present a more optimistic picture with growth in 
GNP expected to recover to 3 per cent. Much of the recovery between 2008 
and 2009 is due to our anticipation that the contraction in house building will 
be concentrated in 2008 and moderate in 2009. However, with the 
international climate expected to improve, we also foresee an increase in 
xport growth in 2009 relative to 2008. The general pick-up should also see 
umer 
confidence. 
 
While these remarks capture the broad essence of how we see economic 
developments unfolding over the next 21 months, we want to look at two 
particular issues, both of which have been alluded to above. We look first at 
the deterioration in the public finances and then at the importance of services 
exports for our overall view. 
 
 We noted in the section on Government Spending and the Public Finances that 
the General Government balance is expected to move from a surplus of 2.9 
per cent of GDP in 2006 to a deficit of 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2008. This 
forecast is based on our own tax forecasts. If the tax forecasting elasticities of 
n 2009 of 
Public 
economic context and they have all tended to be negative f
perspective of economic growth. With falling consumer confid
e
consumption rising, some increase in employment and improved cons
Finances 
the Department of Finance were used, the estimate of the 2008 deficit would 
be even larger. For 2009 we foresee an improvement in the rate of economic 
growth and hence an increase in the rate of growth of current revenues (see 
Table 3). However, we also see a further deterioration in the public finances. 
This arises whether we use a figure for current expenditure growth i
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 5.6 per cent (the official figure contained in the Bu
own forecast of 7.7 per cent.  
 
It could well happen that the outturn we present for 2009 will 
materialise but in order to avoid this the Government will have to constr
dget book of 2008) or our 
not 
ain 
public spending to a greater extent than we have assumed. We believe that 
this will be difficult. Efforts to control spending in 2008 may be understood 
and accepted in a context of an economic slowdown. However, a second year 
of curtailment will not be as readily accepted in the changed context of an 
omic recovery. For these reasons, we expect that the public finances will 
at current market prices was €10 billion so the services export growth 
f 
 trends that we are forecasting the levels of growth outlined in 
hi
ntly good data to assess this concern. One piece 
ta that we can point to is employment growth in financial and other 
Services 
econ
present a challenge in 2009 and decisions made in 2008 should be mindful of 
this. In this context, the recent decisions by the Benchmarking body to 
severely restrict special increases is to be welcomed. 
 
 As regards our second area of focus, services exports, it is useful to present 
some nominal absolute figures (as opposed to percentage increases) to 
provide a sense of their growing importance to the Irish economy. In 2007, 
services exports (excluding tourism) grew by an estimated €7.6 billion. For 
2006, the corresponding figure was €6.4 billion. In both of these years, the 
growth in merchandise exports was just under €700 million. In 2007, growth 
 GNP 
Exports 
in
o €7.6 billion formed a high proportion of the overall growth. 
 
Much of our forecast for economic growth is based on an expectation of 
continued strong growth in services exports. For 2008, we are forecasting an 
increase of €7 billion in services exports. For 2009, this figure is over €8 
billion. For 2009, overall growth in nominal GNP is forecast to be €8.3 billion 
hich indicates the importance of services exports. w
 
Services exports from Ireland have boomed in recent years even though 
competitiveness has been declining. The rise in services exports is seen in 
both volumes and values as prices have increased, in contrast to the situation 
for merchandise exports. This suggests that services exports may be less 
price-sensitive than merchandise exports. This also helps to explain why 
Ireland’s export performance in 2006 and 2007 has been good, even though 
merchandise exports virtually stagnated in value terms. It is on the basis of 
ese recentth
t s Commentary. Generally, we have no concrete reasons to expect a change 
from recent trends. One possible exception to this would be concerns 
surrounding employment and output in the financial services sector given the 
turmoil in global financial markets. Were Irish-based activities to be impacted 
upon negatively, our services-growth figures might be overly optimistic. In 
uth, we do not have sufficietr
of da
business services in the last quarter of 2007. Employment in this sector grew 
by 5,000 in that quarter and so no downturn is evident from this data. 
 
It is clear that our forecasts would be very vulnerable to any change in the 
outlook for services exports. For this reason, we will need to monitor this 
sector closely and in particular to assess in more concrete terms if our 
hypothesis regarding its insulation from competitiveness pressures relative to 
merchandise exports is correct. 
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By the late 1990s Ireland had become one of the major European centres of computer 
hardware production, accounting for 5 per cent of global computer exports and about one-
third of all personal computers sold in Europe. Ireland at this stage also accounted for 
around 6 per cent of global exports of electronic components. The sector has experienced a 
sharp decline since then as production has relocated eastwards to China and to Central and 
Eastern Europe. About one-third of the jobs in the sector were lost between 2000 and 
2004. This paper charts the history of the sector in Ireland and analyses the process of 
employment adjustment as the sector declined.  
Abstract 
 
 International relocation of industrial sectors is a continuous process, driven 
by industry-specific factors such as those emphasised by the product life-cycle 
model and country-specific changes in comparative advantage.  The present 
phase of globalisation is also heavily influenced by developments in 
information and communications technology and by the integration of China, 
India and the former Soviet bloc into the global marketplace. 
1. 
Introduction 
 
While certain groups of workers and owners of specific types of capital are 
undoubtedly hurt by industrial relocation, the consequences are generally 
thought to be beneficial at both the global and the national level when factor-
market adjustments are complete. The adjustment process can take a 
substantial length of time in a recessionary environment or in the presence of 
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labour-market rigidities however, and these short-term costs must be set 
against the long-term benefits.1
 
Ireland has been fortunate that the substantial loss of computer hardware 
employment over the course of the new millennium has taken place under 
generally benign macroeconomic conditions which have facilitated the 
reallocation of labour. The paper seeks to chart the adjustment process that 
has characterised this period. We find that adjustment costs in the Irish case 
have been lower than might have been anticipated, both because workers 
found it relatively easy to acquire new jobs and because the departing 
companies had relatively limited linkages.  
 
In addition to official statistics, the paper also makes use of newspaper 
accounts and of data collected through interviews. As part of a larger study, 
three rounds of semi-structured and structured interviews were conducted 
with general managers of five branded microcomputer makers located in 
Ireland (for more detailed information see Van Egeraat and Jacobson, 2004). 
In 2006 additional interviews were conducted with representatives of a range 
of bodies including the industrial promotion agencies, employment agencies 
and labour unions. These unstructured interviews specifically dealt with the 
redundancy process. This more diffuse and retrospective information helps us 
address the question of what became of those whose existing jobs 
disappeared. 
 
We find that adjustment took several forms: (i) As hardware assembly 
firms pulled out, they were frequently replaced by firms operating in related 
though higher-wage or higher-technology segments. (ii)  The assembly firms 
that remained shifted their Irish operations from assembly into higher value-
added non-manufacturing functions such as sales and technical-support call 
centres and logistics. (iii) The fact that both short-term and long-term 
unemployment remained low as the hardware sector contracted suggests that 
displaced workers were able to move to other jobs relatively easily. Though 
the sector is of course small relative to the size of the total economy, this 
suggestion is supported by the qualitative evidence offered here. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 begins with an overview of 
trends in the global and European geographies of the computer and 
computer components sectors and traces the evolution of Irish exports and 
employment in these and related services sectors. Section 3 follows with a 
micro-level account of the history of the computer hardware sector in 
Ireland. Section 4 discusses the outcome of labour shedding within a number 
of important hardware firms and traces, to the extent possible, the movement 
of displaced workers to other firms and other sectors. A final section offers 
some concluding comments. 
 
 
 
 
1 There is a vast theoretical literature analysing the public-policy issues that arise here; see e.g. 
the surveys by Kletzer (2004), Baicker and Rehavi (2004) and Barry and Walsh (2008). The 
latter also review the literature on the impact of international offshoring on wages and 
labour-market adjustments in the home country. 
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Barry and Curran (2004) provide data on the evolution of the shares of 
various countries in world computer hardware exports, charting the decline in 
importance over the 1990s of the more advanced countries in the case of 
each of the triad regions (Europe, Asia and the Americas) and the increase in 
export shares emanating from the periphery. In Europe, Ireland’s share 
expanded while that of France, Germany and the UK declined, while in the 
Americas the shares of Mexico and Costa Rica rose as those of Canada and 
the US declined. As Table 1 shows, however, the Irish share declined again 
over the course of the new millennium, as Central and Eastern Europe and, 
more significantly, China entered the picture.2
2. 
Ireland and 
the Changing 
Geography of 
the 
Computer 
Hardware 
and Related 
Services 
Sectors  
 
While Ireland lost ground in both Computers and Electronic Components 
over the latter period, however, it gained market share in Digital Integrated 
Circuits. The products in this trade category are of a higher value-added 
nature than the products in the Electronic Components category. The trade 
category SITC 77641 includes integrated circuits for a variety of devices, 
including consumer electronics and automobiles. In the Irish case, the bulk of 
these exports are accounted for by microprocessors for computers, so 
Ireland’s share of world exports in digital integrated circuits for computers is 
understated in the table. These data are suggestive of a refocusing within the 
hardware sector from lower value-added computer components to higher 
value-added segments. 
Table 1: Country Shares in World Computer Hardware Exports 
    
 
SITC 752 
 
Computers 
SITC 75997 
 
Electronic Components 
SITC 77641 
 
Digital Integrated Circuits 
          
  1992 2000 2005 1992 2000 2005 1992 2000 2005 
Ireland 2 5 4.6 5 6 2.5 0.4 2.4 2.7 
United Kingdom  9 8 3.5 7 4 3.7 7.0 3.6 2.8 
Hungary 0 1 1.1 0 1 0.34 0 0.03 0.12 
Czech Republic 0 1 1.5 0 0 0.49 n.d 0.04 0.23 
China 0 6 28.3 1 4 15.4 0.0 0.6 6.9 
World (values 
$millions)   269,899     183,779     176,882 
          
Source: UN Trade Statistics by SITC (standard international trade classification) category. 
 
Switching from trade to employment data and focusing now solely on 
Europe, Table 2 depicts the relative importance of computer hardware 
employment in selected EU25 countries. The table shows that the office 
machinery and computer and electronic components sectors are relatively 
important sectors in Ireland. The share of office machinery and computers in 
manufacturing in 2000 was more than eleven times greater in Ireland than in 
the EU25. The share of electronic components was also much larger than in 
the EU25 though less dramatically so than in the case of office machinery as 
electronic components production tends to be more globalised.  
 
2 The UK and China are included as benchmarks, while the inclusion of the Czech Republic 
and Hungary is designed to illustrate the inroads being made by the CEEC.  
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Table 2: Computer Sector Employment as a Share of Total Manufacturing in Various 
EU25 Countries 
   
 Office Machinery and Computers Electronic Components 
 Nace 30 Nace 321 
 2000 2003 2004 2000 2003 
Ireland 8.0 5.7 6.4 3.7 2.9 
UK 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.1 0.8 
Czech Republic 0.3 0.6 0.7 1.4 1.3 
Hungary 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.8 1.9 
EU25 0.7 0.6 n.d. 1.0 0.9 
      
Source: Eurostat. 
 
The share of both sectors has been falling significantly in recent years 
however, as have absolute employment numbers.  Raw employment numbers 
are plotted in Figure 1, and recent trends in Ireland, the US, the EU15 and 
the CEEC10 in Figures 2 and 3.3
Figure 1: Irish Employment in Computers and Components, 1979-2006 
0
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15000
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25000
1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
NACE 30
NACE 3210
Source: Eurostat; Central Statistics Office Census of Industrial Production. 
 
 
The fall in Ireland’s global export share suggests that the decline in 
Ireland’s computer hardware sector is ascribable to shifting comparative 
advantage rather than to a global high-tech downturn in the wake of the dot-
com bubble.  
 
 
 
 
3 The CSO employment figures for the two NACE categories include employment in services 
activities carried out in enterprises where the majority of output is classified as 
manufacturing. Our knowledge of the main companies involved suggests that on balance the 
figures overstate the number of computer hardware jobs in Ireland. A small shift of 
employment can lead to a company being reclassified from manufacturing to services (if the 
change is sustained for two years) in which case the loss of hardware jobs will be overstated.  
On balance, we believe that this leads to a modest overstatement of the fall in hardware 
employment. As will be illustrated in the case studies of the main companies in the sector, 
however, the reduction in computer hardware employment is genuine and significant.   
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Figure 2: Employment Trends in Computers, 1999-2004 
Source: Eurostat and US BLS. 
ends in Electronic Components 
the years 
2002-2005 while the enterprise level data are also confidential for 2004 and 2005. 
 
ing a rate 
f 10 per cent, to around 91,000, yielding a rate of around 4 per cent, in 2006. 
he rate of long-term unemployment (of over 1 year’s duration) declined 
ev
 find alternative employment.  It is our contention – for 
hich the case study analyses offer supportive evidence – that many of these 
dis
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Note: The CSO reports that the local unit data for NACE 3210 are confidential for 
 
 
Over this period, however, the Irish labour market remained buoyant, with
unemployment declining from a total of 159,000 in 1997, represent
o
T
en more precipitously, from 5.6 per cent (86,000) to 1.4 per cent (30,000), 
as seen in Figure 4. 
 
Hence, it is unlikely that displaced workers would have encountered 
anything like the difficulties they might have encountered in other European 
countries in trying to
w
placed workers would have found employment in the expanding services 
sector, and in particular in computer-related service activities. 
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Figure 4: Unemployment and Long-Term Unemployment in Ireland 
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Ireland’s strong showing in attracting FDI projects in these services areas
is illustrated by data from UNCTAD (2004, p. 162) which show that Ireland
with about 1 per cent of the EU15 population – captured 17 per cent of new 
2002-03 period.4 Data on computer and information services ex
unfortunately not available for all countries (notably India
fr
elsum and Rief (2006, Figures 1 and 2 ) show, not only did Ireland achieve 
outstanding growth in this combined category between 1995 and 2003, it was 
also starting – unlike many of the other high-growth countries – from a 
relatively high base. 
 
Turning to the employment data, Table 3 presents data from the Annual 
Services Inquiry, showing that for the five-year period 1999 to 2004 
employment in computer services and related services activities grew by 
nearly 10,000, an increase of 53 per cent. Total services employment grew by 
43 per cent, creating 220,000 new jobs. 
 
e on internationally-traded services. From this we calculate employment in 
business process services export (BPSE) activities other than in international 
financial services. Around half of the indigenous BPSE segment and one-
third of the foreign-owned BPSE segment is thought to be in software and 
computer services and the remainder c
rketing, intellectual property licensing, professional consulting and 
internet-based business.  
 
 
 
4 It is well-known, furthermore, that while Ireland’s share of global merchandise trade has 
declined in recent years, its share of global services trade has undergone a rapid expansion; 
Forfás (2005). 
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Table 3: Persons Employed in Computer and Related Services and in All 
Services 
   
 
Computer and Related 
Activities All Services 
1999 18,612 515,500 
2000 18,779 553,700 
2001 22,260 608,500 
2002 22,211 668,876 
2003 24,030 713,117 
2004 28,426 736,969 
2005 no data 740,419 
Absolute increase 1999-2004 9,814 221,469 
Percentage increase 1999-2004 +53% +43% 
   
S rostat and CSO Annual Services Inquiry. 
 
ure 5 charts the growth in emp t in non-IFS tivities 
against the decline in computer hardware employment (NACE 30 and 3210).5  
As the figure illustrates, the indigenous BPSE segment now employs around 
t  as the entire ter hardware s ile the 
foreign-owned BPSE segment employs s tially more. For wned 
 level of employment as the entire 
t the same number of jobs as the 
ar
Figure 5:
The strong growth in computer and related services and in BPSE activities 
raises the possibility that displaced hardware-sector workers found 
employment in these related services sectors (as well, of course, as in services 
 
ource: Eu
Fig loymen BPSE ac
he same number of people compu ector, wh
ubstan eign-o
BPSE activities attained about the same
hardware sector in 2000, gained almos
h dware sector shed over the next few years, and has continued its upward 
expansion since 2003. The indigenous BPSE segment has also grown rapidly 
over this period, and its current employment level is now at least equal to that 
in computer hardware.  
 Employment in Computer Hardware and Non-IFS Business Process 
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5 For confidentiality reasons, the most recent employment numbers available for NACE 3210 
refer to 2003. We hold employment at this level, comprising 6,542 jobs, for the remaining 
years shown. We count all agency-supported international services as BPSE, from which we 
then exclude the international financial services component. 
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more generally). We will hence look at a number of case studies to try 
their subsequent employme
to track 
nt paths. 
 
 Having begun with an overview of aggregate trends in the sectors under 
discussion, we now present a brief firm-level history of the computer 
hardware sector in Ireland.6
COMPUTER ASSEMBLY 
In 1971 Digital Equipment Corporation, one of the pioneers in the 
minicomputer industry, set up a large-scale minicomputer manufacturing 
plant in Ireland. This was followed by five other minicomputer companies in 
the latter half of the 1970s, while Amdahl began to assemble mainframes.  
Most of these firms closed their Irish plants in the 1980s and were replaced 
by PC manufacturers, beginning with Apple in 1980. Zenith and Wang 
h facilities in the early 
lo
89 with the decision of Intel to invest in 
histicated microprocessor wafer manufacturing plant as well as a PC and 
nical support call centres, 
d, in some cases, regional headquarters.  
 
OMPONENTS 
l 
pened an automated controller circuit board manufacturing facility and the 
 
3. 
The Rise and 
Decline of 
Computer 
Hardware 
Production in 
Ireland: 
Firm-Level 
Case Studies 
followed in the mid-1980s, with both closing their Iris
990s. Digital, which had started assembling workstations and PCs in Ireland, 1
c sed its Irish assembly plants in 1993. These losses, however, were more 
than offset by the arrival of three new PC assemblers, Dell, Gateway and 
AST, while an indigenous subcontractor, Horman Electronics, began full 
system assembly for Apple.  
 
 major breakthrough came in 19A
a sop
motherboard assembly plant. A large number of other companies followed in 
the early 1990s. By 1999, according to IDA calculations, 33 per cent of PCs 
sold in Europe were assembled in Ireland, while most operations also 
included other functions such as sales and tech
European logistics centres an
Between 1998 and 2002, the Irish microcomputer assembly sector 
experienced serious job-losses and plant closures. Intel ceased system 
assembly in Ireland and consolidated assembly activities in Malaysia, Puerto 
Rico and, to a lesser extent, the US. Apple shed 450 jobs when the 
production of i-Mac systems was out-sourced, first to LG Electronics in 
Wales, subsequently to LG in the Far East, and finally to Foxconn in the 
Czech Republic. Horman Electronics lost its system assembly contract with 
Apple. AST and Gateway both closed their European operations. Thus, of 
the five microcomputer companies existing in 1998, by 2002 only Dell and 
Apple continued to assemble microcomputers, while Apple’s system assembly 
operations had been seriously downsized. 
C
The computer component and peripheral sector in Ireland experienced 
similar churning. In the second half of the 1970s a range of products such as 
memory, printers, components for disc drives, cables/interconnect material 
and floppy drives were produced in Ireland, while Digital had opened a plant 
to produce network components for in-house use. The economic crisis of the 
early 1980s saw a number of components manufacturers close their Irish 
lants, while few new investments emerged to replace them. Western Digitap
o
6 This section draws on Van Egeraat and Jacobson (2004, 2005 and 2006). 
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Ke
 an increasing share of the market 
for enclosures, cables, printed matter, packaging and supply-chain 
es. One of the most significant developments was Intel’s 
contract manufacturing and 
o
st in enclosure manufacturing and 
b
ate closed its hard disk drive 
ss
purchased from local supply chain managers but manufactured in other 
yboard Company set up a facility to supply Apple, though this plant was 
closed in 1985 shortly after Apple took it over.  
 
During the second half of the 1980s, a number of foreign companies 
began to assemble keyboards, mice and cables for the expanding local and 
European markets. BG Turnkey, an indigenous company, carried out simple 
sub-assembly activities for Apple in Cork and Apple started automated 
motherboard assembly for in-house use.   
 
More substantial progress was made in the early 1990s. Existing and newly 
established indigenous companies captured
management servic
decision to invest in a high-tech microprocessor wafer fabrication plant. The 
accumulated base of component suppliers and system assemblers fed the 
perception of the creation of an integrated PC cluster, and by 1995 computer 
assemblers were thought to source 27 per cent of their material inputs in 
Ireland, up from 6 per cent in the mid-1980s. 
 
In 1996 the IDA started to actively discourage large companies from 
locating certain manufacturing operations in Ireland, due to increasing 
competition from low-wage economies. These included peripherals and 
media, which depended on a lower cost base. New sub-sectors that began to 
e targeted included software development, b
c mputer networking/data-communication.  
 
Ireland continued to attract a number of high-tech high-output 
manufacturing and service projects, notably successive Intel wafer fabrication 
plants. Furthermore, a substantial number of foreign contract electronics 
anufacturers (CEMs) continued to invem
su assembly plants. In most cases this involved the take-over of existing 
indigenous companies and plants.  Between 1995 and 1998 however, a large 
number of low- and medium-tech component manufacturers closed their 
Irish plants and shifted production abroad, primarily to the Far East.  
 
At one stage roughly 90 per cent of computer mice sold in Europe were 
manufactured in Ireland but this ended when Logitech closed its Irish 
operations. Keyboard manufacturers Keytronics, Alps and Mitsumi shifted 
keyboard manufacturing from Ireland to the Far East and continued in 
reland as distribution operations only. SeagI
a embly facility to consolidate production in the Far East. Disk drive 
component supplier Applied Magnetics closed. Both Intel and Apple shifted 
their labour-intensive motherboard assembly activities – also to the Far East – 
while Intel ceased its cartridge assembly activities to consolidate in the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico, refitting its Irish plant for wafer production.  Six 
enclosure manufacturing and subassembly plants closed over the period 1999-
003 while other plants downsized. 2
LOCAL LINKAGES BETWEEN ASSEMBLY AND COMPONENTS 
The Forfás Irish Economy Expenditure data suggest that local sourcing of 
components by microcomputer assembly firms increased rapidly from 6 per 
cent of material inputs in the mid-1980s to 27 per cent in the mid-1990s and 
28 per cent in 1999. These figures, however, include expenditures on items 
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regions, as well as expenditures on complete systems manufactured by 
contract manufacturers with local operations. Such items should 
7
not be 
onsidered as vertical production linkages, however.
 
edia and other language-specific parts. 
Similarly, five keyboard localisation plants merely laser printed (non-English-
, the 
manufacturing of office 
a
PPLE 
 that the final assembly and test processing of the new low-cost 
 
7 The fact that a company’s Global HQ subcontracts production to a company that happens 
to have a plant in Ireland may have little to do with the fact that the company has a plant in 
Ireland. In this case it is not a local linkage. 
8 A number of the computer assembly closures pre-2000 do not show up in the aggregate 
sectoral data mainly because Dell continued to expand until 2001. With regard to 
components, again some of the pre-2000 redundancies do not show up in the industry-level 
data because quite a number of companies (and particularly the high-tech element) were 
n 13, Feb 16 and July 5, 2001). 
4. 
c
More careful analysis by Van Egeraat and Jacobson (2005) which excludes 
items bought from local supply chain managers suggests that, on average, 
only 10 per cent of the parts and components sourced by assemblers in 
Ireland were manufactured in the country. The only items significantly 
sourced in the region were enclosures, motherboards-backpanels, network 
cards, non-English language keyboards, digital/printed media, cables/ 
interconnect and packaging materials, and accessory kits. 
 
Furthermore, the actual production activities in many plants added limited 
value to the product. For example, apart from digital printing activity, eleven 
kitting plants merely packaged m
language) keyboards that had been manufactured overseas. Similarly
production activities of turnkey suppliers involved in rework activities added 
little value. Hence, the relocation of the computer hardware sector should not 
have as large a secondary effect on the economy as might otherwise be 
thought.   
 
 As seen earlier, the Irish computer hardware sector lost about 10,000 jobs, 
or one-third of its employment, between 2000 and 2004, with about two-
thirds of the job losses occurring in NACE 30 (Inter- and 
Intra-Firm 
Adjustments 
Within the 
ICT Sector in 
Ireland 
m chinery and computers). There was at the same time, however, a 
substantial restructuring into related services segments (and into services 
more generally), in some cases within the same firm.   
 
The following sections detail the experiences of several computer assembly 
companies in transforming their Irish operations and trace, to the extent 
possible, what became of displaced workers.8
A
Apple established a manufacturing operation in Cork in 1984. In 1998, 
however, by which time it employed a total of 1,900 workers in Ireland, it 
closed its Claris subsidiary in Dublin with the loss of 125 jobs.9 In July of that 
year, in the face of recent accumulated losses of $1 billion, the company 
announced it was shifting its printed circuit board facility to the Far East, 
leading to the shedding of 150 full-time jobs and as many as 400 temporary 
posts from the company’s Irish operations. At the same time, however, it was 
announced
expanding up to 2001.  
9 The material on Apple is based on reports carried in The Irish Times (July 2 and Sept 18, 
1998; Jan 30 and Feb 2, 3 and 5, 1999; and Ja
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and 
would move to Ireland.
versatile iMac, on which the company pinned its hopes of recovery, 
 the announcement of 
 further 500 job losses in the Irish plant in 1999 (with most of the actual 
red
d and the company’s European 
HQ was also to remain here. 
ateway established a manufacturing and support hub for the EMEA region 
in 
hough the plant, like most foreign-owned high-tech operations in 
Ireland, was not unionised, the redundant Gateway employees, with the 
ass
within the industry.  Gateway also agreed to repay Irish government grants of 
IR£19 million, though the figure was to be reduced if the company 
wed to jump the queue “…because otherwise he would be late for 
cles of July 21, 
2001. 
10 The Irish operations were also focused on the 
production of the company’s latest powerful G3 processor products for 
Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA). Ironically, however, the 
subsequent success of the iMac led the company to outsource production to 
the Korean electronics company Lucky Goldstar, which shifted production to 
its facilities in Singapore, Mexico and Wales, leading to
a
undancies occurring in 2000-2001). Production of the G3 desktop 
computer, designed for the business market and with a much higher profit 
margin than the iMac, was to remain in Irelan
 
By 2001, less than 400 of Apple’s Irish workforce of 1,200 were involved 
in manufacturing.  European customer support services and finance functions 
had been recently transferred to Ireland, which also functioned as a logistics 
centre for the company, and its Cork location was transformed from a 
manufacturing base to a services campus. Local management had 
responsibility for sourcing and logistics and acted as landlord for R&D 
groups engaged in localisation and software, with the latter managed from the 
US. 
 
Apple was the only unionised plant in the sector and workers were 
organised by the trade union SIPTU. SIPTU reports that the market was 
quite buoyant at the time of the job losses and that most workers found new 
employment relatively easily.11 A substantial number of people are reported to 
have gone to Flextronics and to EMC (which is engaged in storage hardware 
manufacturing). Both were recruiting at the time and were looking for 
workers with similar skills, while a number of women were said to have used 
their redundancy payments as an opportunity to stay at home and spend time 
with their children (Interview with local SIPTU representative, June 2005). 
GATEWAY 
G
Dublin in 1993. The operation was closed in summer 2001 when the 
company decided to refocus on the US market. Nine hundred staff were 
employed at its European HQ in Ireland at the time, 400 of whom were in 
lower skill manufacturing jobs and a further 250 in technical support. This 
was the single biggest redundancy announcement since US technology firm 
Seagate closed its operations in Clonmel, Co Tipperary, in 1997.12
 
T
istance of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions and SIPTU, received a 
redundancy package considered to be one of the most generous on offer 
 
10 Singapore had also been under consideration. 
11 One union contact recalls an incident during the writing of redundancy cheques when one 
person asked to be allo
work". 
12 The information on Gateway comes inter alia from The Irish Times arti
August 1, 9 and 17, Oct 30, Nov 22 and Dec 21, 
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outsourced some of its displaced workforce to other firms (such as 
Clientlogic, discussed below) which were also located in Ireland. 
 
Telecom suppliers were expected to be particularly adversely affected by 
the closure of the plant, and hence were hopeful that Gateway would 
outsource its technical support services to an Irish company. At least 15 
companies – based in the Republic, Britain and Europe – contacted Gateway 
to express interest in providing these services. Ultimately, Gateway signed an 
eal with a Dublin-based Canadian firm, Clientlogic, which saved 
13
 conditions 
s 14
it reflected a 
ne
f indicated that they wished to take up FÁS evening 
cla
t to 
ications, fared less well according to the 
eal between Gateway and Clientlogic mirrored that agreed by Motorola and Celestica 
 manufacturing firm. 
from six 
ho 
of its staff. 
outsourcing d
about 150 technical support jobs.  Though demand for Gateway customer 
support services would decline over time because of its decision to exit the 
EMEA region, Clientlogic expected to be able to shift these workers to other 
client accounts such as British Telecom, Boots (Chemists) and Dublin-based 
electronics group Palm. 
 
As well as  receiving 75 per cent of Gateway's redundancy package, those 
who transferred to Clientlogic were offered exactly the same work
a before.  Even given this lucrative offer to 115 of Gateway's technical 
support team of more than 200, only 60 took up the offer, revealing the 
buoyancy of the sectoral jobs market. 
 
Many of the staff from Continental Europe were reported to have 
returned home on receipt of redundancy payments. Other foreign-language 
call centre workers brought their highly transferable skills to other local call 
centres such as Hertz. Many of the younger Irish staff were reported to have 
taken time off to travel. An IDA Ireland spokesman noted that 
w psychology among the younger and more skilled elements of the Irish 
workforce and was quoted to the effect that “…the younger generation, who 
have gone through college, tend to be more flexible and optimistic than 
workers in traditional industries”. 
 
Unlike in the case of previous large redundancies, no government task 
force was set up on this occasion. FÁS established an on-site employment 
office for one month at the time of the closure, with 21 companies from 
North Dublin attending a jobs fair in Gateway to recruit staff for their 
operations.15 About one-quarter of staff who completed outplacement 
courses were reported to have found jobs before the plant’s official closure. A 
further 250 Gateway staf
sses in a range of skill areas. Many of these – a number of whom were 
veterans of previous redundancies by Amdahl, Motorola and others – secured 
employment within months. 
 
These positive developments for those with technical and managerial skills 
hould not mask the fact that production-line operatives, who tend nos
have  tertiary-level  educational qualif
 
13 The d
the previous year, when the two firms signed an international alliance.  Under this agreement, 
most of the Motorola staff transferred to the electronics
14 Gateway also agreed to cover the tax liability on the once-off payments for employees 
transferring to Clientlogic. 
15 Gateway revealed that upon the announcement of closure it had received inquiries 
different Irish-based companies, one of which was electronics manufacturer Flextronics, w
were interested in hiring some 
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sp
es from Ireland to the Far 
a
n process, for 
h
esses operated in the case of Dell.16 Manufacturing operations 
ated in Limerick while a European logistics centre, a 140-strong 
and out-placement assistance. The following year the firm 
n
t was taken over by Samsung (Korea) in September 
 globally, with locations in 
k, Texas, California and China. At its high-water mark in Ireland it 
ecialist outplacement agency brought in by Gateway and the client 
management director at Clientlogic. 
INTEL 
Intel opened its European HQ in Ireland in 1989. PC and motherboard 
assembly began shortly thereafter, as did construction of a sophisticated 
microprocessor wafer manufacturing plant.  The assembly operations reached 
their employment maximum of around 1,500 in 1997.  It subsequently shifted 
s labour-intensive motherboard assembly activitiit
E st, as did Apple; it ceased system assembly in Ireland and consolidated 
assembly activities in Malaysia, Puerto Rico and, to some extent, in the USA, 
and it consolidated cartridge assembly in its plants in the Philippines and 
Puerto Rico. It then refitted its Irish plant for much higher-level wafer 
production. 
 
The Irish Times, in June 1999, reported that some 750 Intel employees 
involved in  assembly functions were informed that their jobs would be 
gradually eliminated as the company upgraded its Irish operations to produce 
the latest microchips. Each of the assembly staff were offered retraining and 
deployment to allow them to transfer to the new productiore
w ich the company estimated that an additional 1,000 employees would be 
required.  Workers transferring from the assembly facilities had their existing 
pay grades preserved. 
DELL 
Similar proc
were loc
European Product Group (involved mainly in localisation as well as product 
and process development) and a sales, technical support and marketing centre 
were located in Bray, near Dublin. 
 
In 2001, the company announced a voluntary redundancy package for 200 
of its 4,000+ employees in Limerick, the first in its 10-year history in the city.  
The job shedding was largely confined to office staff. The firm’s 1,200 
employees in Bray and in Cherrywood, in Dublin, were unaffected. Those 
affected were offered “competitive severance packages”, including more than 
six weeks pay per year of service, extended medical and life cover, career 
ounselling c
a nounced the creation of between 100 and 200 full-time jobs at its call 
centre in Bray. Many of these were to be in highly skilled positions at Dell's 
new multilingual centre, offering technical support services for the firm's 
server and storage products. 
AST (ARI SERVICES EUROPE) 
AST was set up in 1980 in Irvine California and began to operate in Limerick 
in September 1994. I
1997, by which time it had 4,000 employees
Limeric
 
16 The material on job losses in Dell comes from The Irish Times, May 24, 2001, and August 
17, 2002. 
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had 750 employees. By December 1997 this had fallen to 450, all of whom 
had  permanent contracts.  
 
That month the firm announced that 150 Irish jobs were to be shed as part 
of a global restructuring plan. These 150 were expected to find employment 
t the nearby Dell and Cabletron facilities. The Irish facility was eventually 
so
An indication of the possible long-term effects of jobs losses may be gleaned 
C’s manufacturing operations in Galway 
City in the early 1990s.  DEC began manufacturing in Ireland in 1971, 
 region was estimated at some IR£100 million per 
ear.  
 
n, and this was supplemented by an Inter-Agency Task Force 
stablished by the Department of Enterprise and Employment. The most 
sig
 Business support, training and “incubator” facilities together with 
 a part in an ongoing 
edical instruments cluster. 
time of the closure of the Galway plant the company employed 1,700 in 
a
ld to Dell and a substantial component of the workforce simply transferred 
to Dell. 
 
In 1998 the company announced that it was withdrawing from the EU 
market  for desktop computers and server machines (underlining the growing 
dominance of the PC market by the “big four” – Compaq, Dell, IBM and 
HP) to focus on portable notebooks. The smaller Limerick facility now 
operates as ARI Services, a purely services company owned by Samsung. 
DIGITAL ELECTRONICS CORPORATION (DEC) 
from analysis of the demise of DE
17
producing computers for the local market and eventually moving into 
software, systems and support engineering. 
  
The closure of the manufacturing plant in 1993, which resulted in 760 
redundancies, was seen as devastating for the West of Ireland as the 
company’s net worth to the
y
The closure, however, created new opportunities in the region for the pool 
of skills that the company had employed. Digital itself established in-house 
programmes for job search, career change, new business start-ups and 
relocatio
e
nificant outcome was the establishment of Galway Technology Centre, the 
provision of additional training support and advisory services and funding for 
business start-ups, including via the conversion of tax on redundancy pay into 
seed capital grants. 
 
informal networks among key ex-Digital staff all played
transformation of the local economy.  Several high-profile successes such as 
Toucan Technology encouraged other start-ups and helped attract major new 
investors such as Siebel Systems, while persuading existing ones such as 
Nortel and Compaq (which absorbed the software and computer engineering 
areas of Digital) to expand their operations. It also contributed to the 
ergence in Galway of Europe’s leading mem
 
The year after the Galway closure, Digital opened a PC support centre in 
Dublin and later opened a multi-million euro call centre at a new site.  At the 
 
17 The material on DEC draws on Green et al. (2001), Giblin, Ryan and Moroney (2003) and 
Van Egeraat and Jacobson (2004). 
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Ireland. By 1998 employment numbers were back up to 1,400 (comprising its 
HQ in Dublin and what had been its European Software Centre in Galway). 
IB
roup brought IBM’s total workforce in Dublin to 1,000 
n
nature, 
c
 
 production capacity and changes in local factor-market conditions. In 
of its global e-commerce strategy by 
Within services the focus is gradually shifting from low to high-value-
ad
riented architecture, an IBM Business 
cubation Centre, a European Venture Capital Centre, an Innovation Centre 
M 
IBM’s restructuring in Ireland differs from that of the other computer 
assembly companies, largely due to its later establishment in Ireland as a 
hardware manufacturer. Its Irish presence began with a small sales operation 
in 1956. In the early 1980s it was one of the first companies to establish an 
international software facility in the country. After a period of downsizing in 
the early 1990s, the company acquired Lotus in 1995 as part of its corporate 
strategy shift from products to services and solutions. Re-named the Dublin 
oftware Lab, this gS
a d added a significant software development component to its portfolio.  
 
The real turnaround came in 1996 when the company started to invest 
heavily in Ireland as EU developments allowed it to rationalise its European 
operations. The company first opened a PC customer support centre, catering 
for 29 countries (including the US). The same year it began to develop its 
technology campus at Mulhuddart in County Dublin, which included its first 
Irish manufacturing operation as well as a range of other services. From the 
utset, manufacturing activities were of a relatively high value-added o
in luding the manufacturing and testing of logic chips, production of disc 
drive platters in a clean room environment and, since 1999,  production of 
customised high-end network servers.  
  
Since then, the Irish operations have continued to restructure, driven by 
the continued corporate shift towards services, a search for efficiency in
global
2000 IBM placed Dublin at the core 
establishing a supplier portal and data centre to support electronic business 
activities to corporate customers. The portal accounted for 40 per cent of 
IBM’s global web-based procurement. In 2001, the hard disk drive operation 
was relocated to Germany but no redundancies followed among the 300 staff 
involved as new investment occurred in the remaining two manufacturing 
divisions and in high value added activities such as supply chain management 
(The Irish Times, 2 February 2001). IBM Ireland was unaffected by the 
corporate decision taken in 2002 to cut 20,000 jobs globally.  
 
ded activities. Maintenance of laptop computers and call centre support for 
personal computers have been re-located to lower cost locations, but again all 
staff were redeployed in higher value-added activities. The technical support 
call centre was transformed into a “dotcom centre” with staff selling services 
directly to clients rather then simply offering support. (The Irish Times, 16 
August 2002). The Dublin Software Lab expanded and in 2004 launched the 
Dublin Centre for Advanced Studies, one of seven such centres run by IBM 
worldwide. Most recently the company created 300 new jobs in a range of 
projects, including three Competency Centres developing software in areas 
such as biomedical search and service-o
In
and new supply chain operations. By 2006 IBM Ireland employed over 3,700 
staff and its 2004 turnover stood at €2.5 billion. 
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The aim of the paper has been to study the process of employment 
adjustment as the computer hardware sector relocated out of Ireland over the 
early years of the new millennium. Our brief history of the sector revealed 
that there had been extensive churning both of firms and of activities over the 
entire period since mini-computer and mainframe assembly began in the 
1970s. These early firms were replaced by new PC assembly firms in the mid-
1980s and 1990s, so that by the late 1990s Ireland had become one of the 
major European locations for computer assembly. 
 
Ireland at this stage also accounted for around 6 per cent of global exports 
of electronic components. This segment had also been characterised by 
extensive churning. Motherboard assembly and manufacturing of keyboards 
and computer mice shifted abroad over time while higher value-added 
manufacturing activities, notably the production of microprocessors, 
continued to expand. One producer, Intel, now accounts for a large share of 
Irish components employment, and is estimated to have invested some €6 
billion in Ireland since it first set up operations in the country in 1989. 
 
Over recent years, both segments have experienced serious job losses and 
a number of plant closures. The case studies illustrate the various paths 
followed by displaced employees. Plant closures have occasionally led to high-
tech spin offs, as in the case of Digital and more recently in Motorola.18  
Some displaced workers remained employed in their original companies but 
moved to other (higher value-added) manufacturing jobs following retraining, 
en in the case of Intel. Others, as in the cases of AST and Gateway, were 
ards a greater involvement 
 software, R&D and a range of other support services. The growth of 
int
ervices 
s were lost in hardware over the early years of the new millennium, while 
no
sector because they do not necessarily occur in the same sector.  
19 BPSE includes software and computer services and a variety of other services such as call 
Concluding 
Comments 
as s
able to move rapidly into expanding companies in the local area, serving as an 
indicator of the value of the skills accumulated in the sector. Other displaced 
workers chose to leave the labour force voluntarily.   
 
A number of hardware companies, such as Apple, remained in Ireland and 
shifted their Irish operations, and some of their displaced workers, into 
services activities. As Grimes (2006) notes, “…the general trend is for an on-
going shift away from hardware manufacturing tow
e
in
ernationally traded services activities in these technology corporations 
reflects an evolution towards a greater involvement in servicing other 
affiliates and the various ‘geographies’ of their client base, as they become 
increasingly internationalised.”   
 
In this regard, we pointed to the substantial employment growth in 
computer services and Business Process Services Export activities (BPSE) as 
the hardware sector declined. As many jobs were created in computer s
a
n-IFS BPSE, and of course total services, expanded much more 
dramatically.19 The indigenous (non-IFS-related) BPSE segment now employs 
around the same number of people as the entire computer hardware sector, 
while the foreign-owned BPSE segment employs substantially more. 
 
18 “Motorola Alumni Try Out as Entrepreneurs”, Sunday Tribune, May 15, 2007.  Spin-off 
activities will not necessarily be reflected in an increase in the number of companies in the 
centres. Some 35 per cent of Irish call centres are in the technology sector and Ireland is 
known to attract more high-value, less price-sensitive call centre activity than other offshore 
locations (Barry and van Welsum, 2005). 
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Clearly, not all employees would have found it equally easy to find new 
jobs. The international literature identifies older workers with low educational 
attainment as having the poorest re-employment prospects and this is 
onfirmed in the Irish data. Denny et al. (2000), for example, show that the 
pro
 the pools of skills that had been employed 
nd expanded – even by hardware companies that later downsized and 
ret
 
 
appear to be less 
kely to be lost. The analysis of Forfás employment data in the Appendix 
sh
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Results for job-creation persistence by sector three years after initial job 
creation are given in Table A1. Differences in sectoral job-persistence 
measures may simply reflect differences in plant size, plant age and nationality  
Table A1: Percentage of New Jobs Remaining after 3 Years, by Sector* 
PPENDIX
PJOB ERSISTENCE 
CROSS S  
orfás employment survey data allow one to track changes in job numbers 
in individual plants over time, and to determine how long these changes in 
employment numbers persist. This is frequently treated as a proxy for job life, 
though it does not capture intra-firm job turnover for example.   
    
 NACE 3 Years Unadjusted Rank 
Food Products 15 54 13 
Drink and Tobacco  16 69 5 
Textiles 17 52 16 
Clothing 18 44 20 
Leather and Footwear 19 33 22 
Wood Products 20 50 19 
Pulp paper and paper products 21 58 9 
Publishing and Printing  22 57 10 
Manufacturing of coke, refining 23 54 14 
Chemicals and Chemical 24 74 1 
Rubber and Plastic Products 25 56 12 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26 53 15 
Basic Metal Products 27 40 21 
Fabricated and Structural Metal 28 51 18 
Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 29 57 11 
Office Machinery and Computers 30 70 3 
Electrical Machinery and 31 61 7 
Electronic Equipment 32 70 4 
Medical and Precision 33 73 2 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 34 59 8 
Other Transport Equipment 35 63 6 
Other Manufacturing n.e.c. 36 51 17 
Recycling 37 27 23 
    
 
 *This is taken from background work prepared by Frank Barry and Eric Strobl for Walsh et 
al. (2003). 
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of ownership. Jobs created in younger plants  are substantially more persistent 
than those in older plants while job
durable than indigenous ones. From a
that sectors differ across these chara
therefore control for them (in the sense of reporting o
persistence rate would be,  were age, size and nationalit
to reflect the manufacturing average). 
 
 
s created in foreign plants are more 
 policy perspective, however, the fact 
cteristics is important and we do not 
n what each sector’s 
y in the sector simply 
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